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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION - PROCEDURAL SAFE-
GUARDS OF WITNESSES BEFORE INVESTIGATIVE BODIES R.EQUIRE CONFRONTATION
AND CROSS-EXAMINATION. - The Civil Rights Commission scheduled a hearing to
investigate sworn complaints that Negroes were being denied the right to vote in
certain Louisiana parishes. The Commission subpoenaed the voting registrars of
several parishes to appear before it and to produce their voting registration records
for its inspection. Plaintiffs, voting registrars, refused to obey the subpoenas and
brought suit to stay their effectiveness and to enjoin the Commission from con-
ducting its proposed hearing. Held: injunction granted. Even though the creation
of the Commission itself was not unconstitutional, as the plaintiffs had contended,
Congress did not authorize the Commission to adopt rules of procedure which would
prevent witnesses before it from confronting and cross-examining those who had
complained against them. Larche v. Hannah, 177 F. Supp. 816 (W. D. La. 1959),
leave granted to argue certiorari, jurisdiction, and the merits, 361 U. S. 910 (1959),
argued January 19, 1960, 28 U.S.L. WEEx 3221.
The Administrative Procedure Act" grants witnesses before federal agencies
certain procedural rights.' As the court points out in the principal case, however,
this act applies only to agencies which are engaged in rule-making or adjudication;
3
since the Civil Rights Commission does neither, it is not subject to the procedural
provisions of the APA.
4
What, then, does the Civil Rights Commission do? Most likely, the proceedings
of the Commission, including the hearing enjoined in Larche v. Hannah, can best
be described as "investigations."
Earlier cases have distinguished between "investigation" and the more formal
kinds of agency activity.5 An investigation has its own peculiar characteristics. For
example, it is held to obtain information, not to take action against someone;" there
are no parties in opposition;7 no rights of parties are finally determined; s and it is
preliminary to the filing of any criminal charges. 9 Since the proceedings of the
Civil Rights Commission fall within this description, it is safe to say that they are
"investigations" within the meaning attributed to that term by present judicial opin-
ion.10 The APA also seems to recognize that there is a third form of agency activity
1 60 Stat. 237-44 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1958). The Administrative Procedure
Act will henceforth be referred to as the APA.
2 See, e.g., 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (1958), which grants parties to dis-
putes the right to present their cases, to submit rebuttal evidence, and to "conduct such cross-
examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts."
3 I.e., agencies which are exercising quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial powers. For purposes
of definition we may say that rule-making involves prescribing rules to govern future action;
adjudication involves determining the present legal status of definite parties with regard to past
action. 1 DAvis, ADrMINISTRAT vE LAW TREATISE, § 5.01, at 286-87 (1958). For a more ex-
tended discussion of these distinctions see Note, 35 NOTRE DAME LAW. 77 (1959).
4 Larche v. Hannah, 177 F. Supp. 816, 819 n.3 (W. D. La. 1959).
5 Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1944), and In re SEC, 84 F.2d 316 (2d Cir.
1936), rev'd as moot sub 'nom., Bracken v. SEC, 299 U.S. 504 (1936), distinguish between
the "investigation" and the "hearing." They describe a "hearing" as a formal, trial-type pro-
cedure, with named adversary parties and issues of law and fact to be decided.
6 Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1944).
7 In re SEC, 84 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1936), rev'd as moot sub noma., Bracken v. SEC, 299
U.S. 504 (1936).
8 Torras v. Stradley, 103 F. Supp. 737 (N. D. Ga. 1951).
9 In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
10 See cases cited, notes 5-9 supra.
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distinct from rule-making or adjudication. It exempts from its procedural require-
ments such matters as are subject to a later trial de novo."l
Since the Larche opinion speaks in terms of witnesses before the Commission
being "deprived" of "rights," 1 2 particularly those of confronting and cross-examin-
ing their "accusers," it is of interest to examine just what rights - if any - inhere
in witnesses before investigative bodies.
With but few exceptions the courts liken the investigative body to a grand
jury.'3 Notably, witnesses before investigative bodies are denied the right to coun-
sel,14 to a transcript of the proceedings,-5 to a public hearing,16 and to have a per-
sonal stenographer present.' The right of an individual witness before such bodies
to cross-examine adverse witnesses seems never to have been considered;" nor has
confrontation. One would think, however, that in a proceeding wherein" witnesses
are denied such basic rights as counsel, a transcript, and a public hearing, it would
be inconsistent with the nature of the activity to assert that they have a right to
confront or to cross-examine adverse witnesses. And, if we may trust the grand jury
analogy used in the cases, the fact that witnesses before grand juries are traditionally
denied such rights should settle the question.
Witnesses before investigative tribunals are accorded the privilege against self-
incrimination, where the state constitution provides for it,' 9 or where the case in-
volves a substantial possibility of incrimination under a federal statute.20 In the light
of the foregoing discussion, this privilege would seem to be the only protection these
witnesses have.
Thus it would seem that the plaintiffs in Larche v. Hannah did not possess the
procedural rights they claimed the Civil Rights Commission would deny to them.
Hence, any discussion of whether or not the Commission had congressional authority
to "deny" these "rights" is moot. Even if we grant for the purpose of argument
that the Commission did need such congressional authority, the facts of the case
show that it possessed it.
The majority in Larche based its reasoning largely upon the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Greene v. McElroy.21 In that case, Greene, an employee of a firm
of government contractors, lost his job because a Defense Department loyalty board
revoked his security clearance. This result followed a hearing at which the testimony
of secret informers was introduced to show Greene guilty of highly questionable
contacts with Communists and Russian Embassy officials. Greene was given no op-
portunity to confront or cross-examine his hidden accusers. The Court held that,
"in the absence of explicit authorization from ... the President or Congress [the
Defense Department was] not empowered to deprive [Greene] of his job in a pro-
11 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1958).
12 177 F. Supp. 816 passim (1959).
13 Anonymous Nos. 6 and 7 v. Baker, 360 U. S. 287 (1959); In re Groban, 352 U. S. 330
(1957); Genecov v. Federal Petroleum Board, 146 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 865 (1945); Wooley v. United States, 97 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305
U.S. 614 (1948).
14 Anonymous Nos. 6 and 7 v. Baker, 360 U. S. 287 (1959); In re Groban, 352 U. S. 330
(1957).
15 Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1944); In re SEC, 84 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1936),
rev'd as moot sub nom., Bracken v. SEC, 299 U. S. 504 (1936).
16 Bowles v. Baer, 142 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1944).
17 Torras v. Stradley, 103 F. Supp. 737 (N. D. Ga. 1951).
18 In one case a corporate party to a Tariff Commission hearing was not allowed to cross-
examine other parties on the grounds that the Tariff Commission is analogous to the Congres-
sional Committees which formerly heard testimony on tariff rates, and which did not allow
cross-examination. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 294 (1933).
19 In re Groban, 352 U. S. 330, 336 (1957) (concurring opinion).
20 United States v. Goodner, 35 F. Supp. 286 (D. Colo. 1940); Graham v. United
States, 99 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1938).
21 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
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ceeding in which he was not afforded the safeguards of confrontation and cross-
examination."
22
The Greene case differs plainly from Larche v. Hannah, since Greene's hearing
was obviously not a mere investigative proceeding, but rather one in which his rights
were being determined. The purpose of the hearing was to take action on his specific
case, not just to obtain information. The safeguards to which Greene might have
been entitled in such a proceeding do not necessarily apply to witnesses in an inves-
tigative proceeding.
Even ignoring this obvious distinction between Greene and Larche, however,
one can see that the Government's argument in Greene that it had been authorized
to use the procedures actually utilized in that case was very weak. The Defense
Department based its claim of authorization on three statutes and two executive or-
ders, none of which makes any mention of rules of procedure at loyalty board hear-
ings.23 On the other hand, the act establishing the Civil Rights Commission pre-
scribes definite, detailed rules of procedure for commission hearings. 24 It is not co-
incidental that these rules are identical with the "House Fair Play Rules" 25 which
govern investigations by committees of the House of Representatives - and which
do not provide for either cross-examination or confrontation. It is evident that these
are the rules Congress wished the Civil Rights Commission to follow; the rules
adopted by the Commission to supplement the statute are not inconsistent there-
with.
26
The Larche court cites Executive Order No. 98 35,2r also cited by Mr. Justice
Clark in his dissent to Greene v. McElroy, to show that the Government's case for
authorization of the procedures used in Greene was even clearer than in Larche. The
Greene majority opinion, however, does not even mention this order, probably be-
cause it was revoked by Executive Order No. 104502' prior to the hearing Greene
complained of.
Thus we see that in Larche v. Hannah the Civil Rights Commission was en-
joined from denying to witnesses "rights" which it appears they did not have in the
first place. It was enjoined from doing so because it was not authorized by Congress
to "deny" these "rights." Yet any clear reading of the statute involved shows clearly
that Congress did so authorize the Commission. Joseph P. Summers
22 Id. at 508.
23 The statutes and Executive Orders involved were the following: 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304,
2306 (1958), which establish procedures for making contracts to supply the Armed Forces; 18
U.S.C. § 798 (1958), which makes it criminal to divulge secret information; 64 Stat. 991
(1950), 50 U.S.C. § 783(b) (1958), which makes it criminal for government employees to
divulge such information; Exec. Order No. 10290, 16 Fed. Reg. 9795 (1951) and Exec. Order
No. 10501, 18 Fed. Reg. 7049 (1953), both of which establish criteria by which security data
may be classified as "secret," "confidential," etc.
24 See 71 Stat. 634 (1957), 42 U.S.C. § 1975a (a)-(i) (1958).
25 See 101 CONG. REc. 3569 (1955).
26 Although no case has arisen on this point, Circuit Judge Wisdom in his dissent to
Larche v. Hannah notes that the Commission, in supplementing the statutory rule of procedure
granting witnesses the right to counsel "for the purpose of advising them concerning their con-
stitutional rights" quite properly read it to mean that counsel were not permitted to cross-
examine. 177 F. Supp. 816, 829 (1959).
27 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1947). The order provided that names of confidential informants
might be withheld from federal agencies which requested information about their personnel;
even had the rule been in effect at the time of the Greene hearing, it would not necessarily
authorize the withholding of the names of the informants from individual "defendants."
28 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953).
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CONFLICT OF LAWS - PUBLIC POLICY - DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
CONTRARY TO POLICY OF FORUM DISALLOWED. - The American Jewish Congress
charged that the Arabian-American Oil Company' had violated subdivisions (1) (a)
and (1) (c) of section 296 of the Executive Law of New York.2 By a vote of the
State Commission Against Discrimination Aramco would be permitted to inquire
into the religion of job applicants as a "bona fide occupational qualification" and
would be authorized to have applicants fill out a visa to Saudi Arabia containing
inquiries as to the applicant's religion. The King of Saudi Arabia prohibits the
employment of Jews in that country and employment by Aramco includes possible
service in Saudi Arabia. Aramco had contended that interference with the arrange-
ments between Aramco and Saudi Arabia in connection with the employment of
Jewish individuals would jeopardize American foreign policy by creating friction
in relations with the King of Saudi Arabia. In order to substantiate this position,
Aramco relied upon informal statements of lower officials in the United States
State Department. On application by the American Jewish Congress for an order
annulling the determination of the Commission, held: order granted. Aramco"cannot defy the declared public policy of New York State and violate its statute
within New York State, no matter what the King of Saudi Arabia says."'3 American
Jewish Congress v. Carter, 19 Misc. 205, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
The Commission Against Discrimination was created by the legislature of New
York to effectuate a public policy against discrimination in employment based on
race, creed, color or national origin.' It is composed of five members appointed
by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate and is empowered to
receive, investigate and pass upon complaints alleging violations under Article 15
of the Executive Law.5
In the present case there was not only the conflict between the policy of New
York prohibiting such discrimination in employment and the policy of Saudi Arabia
prohibiting the employment of Jews, but there was also to be considered the ques-
tion of possible unfavorable repercussions on the foreign policy of the United States
as regards Saudi Arabia. When there arises a question as to which of several com-
peting policy considerations is to prevail, the courts are presented with a difficult
choice.
Generally a state will not enforce foreign law or rights acquired under such
law if to do so would violate the laws or the public policy of the state wherein
enforcement is sought.6 Courts will refuse to enforce a foreign right if such en-
1 Hereafter referred to as Aramco.
2 N.Y. ExEcuTIvz LAW § 296 (1)(a), (c):
It shall be unlawful discriminatory practice: (a) For an employer, because
of the age, race, creed, color or national origin of any individual, to refuse
to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment such indi-
vidual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in
terms, conditions or privileges of employment .... (c) For any employer
or employment agency . . . to use any form of application for employment
or to make inquiry in connection with prospective employment, which
expresses, directly or indirectly, any limitation, specification or discrimina-
tion as to age, race, creed, color or national origin, or any intent to make
any such limitation, specification, or discrimination, unless based upon a
bona fide occupational qualification.
3 American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 19 Misc.2d 205, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218, 220 (1959).
4 N.Y. ExEcUTivE LAw § 290. For a discussion of the "inquiry" aspect of § 296(c) see
Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E.2d 581 (1954) and the annotation, 44 A.L.R.2d
1130 (1954).
5 N.Y. ExEcuTIvELAw §§ 293, 295.
6 Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930); Perutz v. Bohemian Discount
Bank, 304 N.Y. 533, 110 N.E.2d 6, 7 (1953); 11 AM. JUR. Conflict of Laws § 6 (1938);
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612 (1934); See also cases cited in RESTATEMENT,
CONFLICT OF LAws, NEw YORK ANNOTATIONS § 612 (1935).
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forcement would "violate some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent
conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal."
7
Even the contracting parties cannot effect by contract a disregard for the public
policy of a state." Where two parties, as here, enter into a contract (or negotiate)
within the state and the contract is to be performed elsewhere, the state may con-
stitutionally control the terms and obligatiois of the contract.9
On the basis of this general principle it is not hard to justify the decision in the
present case. If Aramco had been seeking in the courts of New York a recognition
of the force of Saudi Arabian law in Saudi Arabia, then such employment require-
ments would be upheld regardless of the policy of New York. 10 But Aramco is
seeking recognition of its rights in New York. The fact that Saudi Arabia prohibits
Jews from working in that country should not override the express policy of the
State of New York prohibiting such discrimination in regard to employment.
The question presented in regard to the possible repercussions on the foreign
policy of the United States by the decision in the present case is worthy of further
discussion. In respect to foreign relations generally, state lines disappear." The
external powers of the United States are to be exercised without regard to state
law or policies.J2 The federal government has exclusive control over foreign re-
lations.13 Were there a valid treaty or even a valid executive agreement involved
here there would be no question but that New York policy would be ignored.
In the present case, it is true, there was no such treaty or agreement. How-
ever, there were "informal statements of State Department underlings,"' 4' caution-
ing against the possible adverse effect upon American foreign policy. In this con-
text it is relevant to inquire whether or not a treaty or agreement, if there were
one, would have been valid.
The Supreme Court of the United States has said several times that the only
limits on the exercise of the treaty power or in the field of international relations
are the provisions of the Constitution itself.' 5 No treaty has ever been held to be
unconstitutional.' 6 In Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.17 it was said that the propriety
of what may be done in the exercise of foreign relations is not a subject of judicial
inquiry. But this all-inclusive statement would seem limited, by the very authorities
cited to support it, to political questions.' A treaty to the effect that Aramco (or
Saudi Arabia) could discriminate against Jews in the United States would probably
be held unconstitutional.' 9
With this in mind should statements from lesser State Department officials in
this regard be made the basis for upsetting the established policy of New York?
It would seem that the policy of New York would be controlling, at least in the
absence of some treaty or agreement showing the desire of the federal government
to override that policy. The policy of the United States to keep on friendly terms
7 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918).
8 The Kensington, 183 U.S. 263, 269 (1902).
9 Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1935).
10 Kleve v. Basler Lebens - Versicherungs - Gesselschaft in Base], 182 Misc. 776, 782, 45
N.Y.S.2d 882, 887 (1943).
11 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
12 Ibid.
13 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942).
14 American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 19 Misc.2d 205, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218, 223 (1959).
15 Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
16 See Corwin, Annotated Constitution of the United States, S. Doc. No. 170, 82d Cong.,
2 Sess. 428 (1953); Note, The Treaty Power-Its Scope and Limitations Under the Con-
stitution, 19 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 422 (1951).
17 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
18 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 309 (1829); In re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472, 503
(1892).
19 Corwin, supra note 16, at 428-31: "No doubt there are specific limitations in the
Constitution in favor of private rights which 'go to the roots' of all power."
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with Saudi Arabia is laudable but it should take more than a mere off-hand and
informal statement of such policy to override the power of a state.
Another interesting policy that could be considered here is the declaration of
Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter:
.... the United Nations shall promote: .... universal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.
All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in con-
nection with the organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth
in Article 55.20
Several state courts have been faced with the argument that this charter, as a
treaty, prohibits certain discriminatory practices.
The Supreme Court of California has held that the charter is a treaty, but
since it is not self-executing it does not purport to impose legal obligations on mem-
ber nations or create rights in private persons unless the several members so legis-
late.2' The Supreme Court of Michigan said that the pronouncements of the
charter "are merely indicative of a desirable social trend and an objective de-
voutly to be desired by all well-thinking peoples." 22 In Rice v. Sioux City Memorial
Park Cemetery2 the Iowa Supreme Court held that the provisions of the charter
had no bearing on a case in which the plaintiff had sued for breach of contract
after the Cemetery Association refused to bury her husband (11/16 Indian) after
she had purchased a lot. There was a clause in the purchase contract that burial
privileges accrued only to Caucasians. In an unusual series of procedural steps the
Supreme Court of the United States first granted certiorari and affirmed by an
equally divided vote, 24' then dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently grant-
ed.2s However, Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the opinion stated:
The Iowa courts dismissed summarily the claim that some of the general
and hortatory language of this Treaty, which so far as the United States
is concerned is itself an exercise of the treaty-maklng power under the
*Constitution, constituted a limitation on the rights of the States and of
persons otherwise reserved to them under the Constitution. It is a re-
dundancy to add that there is, of course, no basis for inference that the divi-
sion of this Court reflected any diversity of opinion on this question.26
Despite the unfavorable reaction to attempts to enforce the provisions of the charter
as a treaty, these provisions would seem to present another policy consideration to
buttress the determination by the New York court in the present case, even conced-
ing the validity of the holding that it is not a self-executing treaty.
In terms of policy considerations then, Aramco would appear to be in no
position to contest the decision. It might be argued that the effect of the decision
20 U. N. CIIARTER arts. 55-6. Saudi Arabia ratified the Charter on October 18, 1945.
59 Stat. 1214 (1945).
21 Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952), affirming 217 P.2d 481, rehearing
denied, 218 P.2d 595 (1950). The lower court held that the charter was a treaty and there-
fore the Alien Land Law, being in conflict with the treaty, was invalid. The California
Supreme Court said that the charter did not govern the case but affirmed the decision holding
that the Alien Land Law violated the fourteenth amendment.
22 Sipes v. McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 628, 25 N.W.2d 638, 644 (1947), rev'd, 334 U.S. 1
(1948). The Michigan Supreme Court held that it was a treaty but that it was inapplicable
to the contractual rights of citizens of the United States suing in state courts. The United States
Supreme Court never mentioned the Charter in its opinion which is better known as Shelley
v. Kramer.
23 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110, 116-17 (1953).
24 348 U.S. 880 (1954).
25 349 U.S. 70 (1955). The writ was dismissed after the Supreme Court was in-
formed that Iowa had passed a statute which would bar the question presented to the Court
here from arising again in Iowa.
26 349 U.S. 70, 73 (1955).
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would be nullified if Aramco made the obtaining of a visa to Saudi Arabia a con-
dition precedent to employment when it appeared likely that the employee would
be required to serve in that country. Doubtless the New York courts could not re-
quire the Saudi Arabian government to grant visas only in accord with New York
policy. However, it would seem that the courts would look to the realities of the
requirement, and if it was an obvious attempt to circumvent the holding of the
instant case, such a requirement would be disallowed.
William J. Luff, Jr.
CRIMINAL LAW - SEARCH AND SEIZURE - CONSPIRACY TO OBSTRUCT JUSTICE
AND TO PERJURE - THE APALACHIN TRIAL - On November 14, 1957, approxi-
mately 63 men met at the Apalachin, New York, home of Joseph Barbara to con-
duct what newspaper accounts surmised to be a "crime convention." I Believing a
criminal conspiracy to be in progress, New York state police set up a check-point
outside the Barbara estate and questioned the twenty defendants as they left. The
defendants claimed that their presence was merely coincidental, and not by any
prearranged plan.2 When subsequently summoned before the federal grand jury of
the Southern District of New York, they reaffirmed their "coincidence" explanation
under oath, in the face of evidence that all arrived at the estate at approximately
the same time, and that they had come from points as distant as Cuba and Cali-
fornia. The grand jury returned an indictment charging the twenty defendants
with a conspiracy3 to give false, misleading, and evasive testimony before a federal
grand jury,4 and thereby to obstruct the orderly administration of justice.5 Held:
guilty. United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) ; 178 F. Supp.
62 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); N.Y.L.J. (Feb. 5, 1960).
The Supreme Court, in Haas v. Henckel,6 established the range of the Federal
Conspiracy Statute as "broad enough in its terms to include any conspiracy for the
purpose of impairing, obstructing, or defeating the lawful function of any depart-
ment of the Government." Notwithstanding a later apparent restriction7 of the
Haas view, the statute has been traditionally interpreted as making the concealment
or misstatement of information before a government agency criminal conduct.
8
1 New York Times, Dec. 19, 1959, p. 1, col. 1; Washington Post, Dec. 19, 1959, p. 1, col. 1.
2 For example: Defendant Cannone claimed to be at the estate to inquire into the pur-
chase of beer equipment. Instructions to the jury, p. 51; defendants Castellano and Gambino
claimed that they came to find out if Barbara's recent heart operation was successful, id. at 55;
defendant Civello claimed he was to attend a barbecue and dice game at the estate, id. at 59;
defendants DeSimone and Scozzari claimed their presence was for social reasons, id. at 63; de-
fendant Larasso claimed to be in the area to buy real estate, id. at 71.
3 If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in
any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act
to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 371 (1954).
4 Whoever, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or per-
son, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be
administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, . . . will-
fully and contrary to such oath states . . . any material matter which he
does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury....
18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1954).
5 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1954) makes it an offense to corruptly influence, obstruct, or im-
pede, or endeavor to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice.
6 216 U.S. 462, 479 (1910).
7 Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U. S. 182 (1924).
8 Ingram v. United States, 360 U. S. 672 (1959) (conspiracy to conceal income tax in-
formation); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946) (filing of false information under
the Alien Registration Act); United States v. Morehead, 243 U.S. 607 (1917) (conspiracy
to commit subornation of perjury in filing of soldier's declaratory statements under the Home-
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Conspiracy convictions have been sustained even where the objective of the agree-
ment was not a crime at the inception of the conspiracy, 9 and where the objective
was not a violation of a federal statute.10 Perhaps the broadest application has been
to cases where the objective alleged was not a crime, but a violation of a federal
statute prescribing only civil redress for its breach."
The conspiracy conviction in Bonanno, although heralded by some as a "land-
mark in the Government's fight against organized crime,"' 2 and assailed by others
as an unfortunately broad interpretation of the conspiracy doctrine, 13 is not without
precedent34 In Outlaw v. United States, 5 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a conviction
for conspiracy to "impede justice" and "defraud the United States by defeating a
lawful government function." The defendant was convicted for conspiracy to bribe
a witness in a criminal case to commit perjury. It can hardly be claimed that a
conspiracy to actually commit perjury is of greater breadth.
Although the conspiracy conviction in Bonanno is based upon sound historical
authority, it must be observed that acceptance of it will provide an effective tool for
government prosecutors who are unable to accumulate evidence to convict a suspect
of the crime of which he was originally suspected, and might prove to be a danger-
ous weapon in the hands of an overly zealous prosecuting attorney. In this regard,
it is instructive to note some of the background of the instant case.
When the police originally made their investigation of the meeting of Novem-
ber 14, 1957, they did so on suspicion of a possible liquor-violation conspiracy.' 6 It
was this suspicion, based upon prior convictions of several of the defendants,' 7 that
gave rise to the grand jury investigation of the meeting. But when the defendants
appeared to be conspiring to give false testimony, investigations of the original sus-
stead Law); CIT Corp. v. United States, 150 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1945) (conspiracy to file false
statements of security, asset value and income under the National Housing Act); United States
v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1942) (conspiracy to tamper with witnesses in criminal
case); Wilder v. United States, 143 Fed. 433 (4th Cir. 1906) (conspiracy to tamper with wit-
nesses in civil litigation) ; Curley v. United States, 130 Fed. 1 (1st Cir. 1904) (impersonation
of a candidate to take a civil service examination).
9 Bailey v. United States, 5 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1925), appeal dismissed, 269 U. S. 589
(1925); Nyquist v. United States, 2 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 267 U.S. 606
(1925).
10 United States v. Belisle, 107 F. Supp. 283 (W. D. Wash. 1951). See Note, 72 HARV.
L. Rav. 920 (1959).
11 In United States v. Hutto, 256 U.S. 524 (1921) the Supreme Court held that an in-
dictment charging conspiracy to violate a statute forbidding anyone employed in the Indian
Department to have an interest in any trade with the Indians was sufficient, even though
this statute prescribed only a civil penalty. In United States v. Wiesner, 216 F.2d 739 (2d
Cir. 1954), the court found that a conspiracy to violate the Gold Reserve Act by the unlicensed
handling of gold was properly indictable, although only a civil penalty was prescribed by the
statute. Judge Harlan stated:
-It is true that the construction which we think § 371 [the section in issue
in Bonanno] must bear is anomalous in that a conspiracy to commit a non-
criminal "offense" may carry a greater punishment than a conspiracy to
commit a misdemeanor.
... The cure for this anomaly may well be something which the Con-
gress will wish to consider, but the courts must take the statute as they
find it.
Supra at 742.
12 New York Times, Dec. 19, 1959, p. 1, col. 1.
13 St. Louis Post Dispatch, Dec. 20, 1959 (editorial).
14 The agreement to give false statements links the Conspiracy Statute to the federal
perjury statute, while the intent to give evasive or misleading testimony seems to link the
Conspiracy Statute to the "obstructing justice" section of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1948). De-
fendants could be convicted of either a conspiracy to violate the perjury statute, or to obstruct
justice, or both.
15 81 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1936).
16 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1960.
17 Newspaper accounts served as a constant and unnecessary reminder of the past crimi-
nal records of the defendants. See New York Times, Dec. 19, 1959, p. 1, col. 1; Washington
Post, Dec. 19, 1959, p. 1, col. 1.
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pected conspiracy came to a halt, and the grand jury returned the indictment for
conspiracy to perjure and obstruct justice. The government was thus able to ma-
nipulate the conviction of the defendants without ever having accumulated evidence
of their original wrongdoing. It is this use of conspiracy theory to bring a substi-
tute conviction that has prompted the Supreme Court to remark recently in Grune-
wald v. United States:"8 "Prior cases in this Court have repeatedly warned that
we will view with disfavor attempts to broaden the already pervasive and wide'-
sweeping nets of conspiracy prosecutions." 1 9
The Bonanno conviction may certainly be assailed on grounds that it is dan-
gerous in that it allows a proceeding based essentially on suspicion of one crime to
result in conviction of conspiracy to commit a different crime, without proof of the
original crime ever being obtained. But, while there is substance to this argument,
it is really an argument against the developed structure of conspiracy law, rather
than a criticism of the Bonanno conviction alone. If conspiracy in its present de-
velopment is to be accepted as a basis of prosecution, it is difficult to reject the
Bonanno conviction since it is apparently in accord with prior prosecutions under
the Federal Conspiracy Statute.
However, the challenge to the legality of the interrogation and detention of
the Apalachin defendants on November 14, 1957 may not be easily dismissed. After
the trial had been under way for a week, defendants moved to suppress all evidence
procured in the original investigation of the gathering at the Barbara estate, claim-
ing that the actions of the state police and federal agents was an illegal search
and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment and the evidence was inadmissible
under the rule of Mallory v. United States.21 At a hearing on the motion held in
camera to avoid prejudice, the only witness, a police officer, testified that stopping
the defendants' cars at the check-point outside the Barbara estate and the subsequent
interrogation at the police station was prompted by a belief, induced by prior con-
victions of several defendants for liquor violations, that an illegal liquor conspiracy
was transpiring.
22
Judge Kaufman, in denying the motion, held that no arrest took place. The
officers were merely conducting an investigation based upon probable cause. In
addition, the statements made by defendants were not in the nature of a confession,
18 353 U.s. 391, 404 (1957).
19 See also Della and Paoli v. United States, 353 U. S. 232 (1957); Bollenbach v. United
States, 326 U. S. 607 (1946). In Grunewald the government was unable to proceed against
defendants for bribery to avoid income tax prosecution since the statute of limitations had run.
Attempting to save the case, the prosecution alleged an agreement to conceal the original
bribery, constituting a continuance of the crime in its "conspiracy to conceal" form. Acceptance
of this theory would certainly avoid any statute of limitations problem, even to the point of
nullifying the statute in any case involving two or more persons. It was this pervasiveness of
the prosecution's theory that led the court to decide for defendant. However, the Bonanno
theory seems much narrower, since it rests upon more than an agreement to conceal; it in-
volves an agreement to perjure. The defendants in Bonanno could have agreed to conceal
by relying upon their fifth amendment right and refusing to testify at all, but they chose to
speak and, assuming the correctness of the jury's factual determination, to speak falsely before
a federal grand jury. See N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1959, n. 21.
20 See 35 NoTRE DAmE LAW. 461 (1960).
21 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
22 At 12:30 p.m. on November 14, 1957, the officers drove to the Barbara Estate and no-
ticed a large gathering there. At 12:50 p.m. they set up a check-point in order to identify
Barbara's guests as they left and stopped several of the defendants, questioning them by the
roadside. At 2:00 p.m. the officers noticed men running through a nearby woods. The ma-
jority of the defendants were stopped after this incident and were sent to the police station
without objection. No formal arrests were made. While at the police station, the defendants
were questioned as quickly as possible as to name, age, address, previous criminal record, and
the purpose for being at Apalachin, and then released. Defendants did not claim that any
coercion or pressure was used in the questioning. None were questioned for more than 30 min-
utes, although it is not made clear in the court's opinion how long they were detained.
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1960.
23 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 5, 1960.
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but were voluntary and exculpatory in nature; thus there was no question of ex-
tracting a confession by coercion or detention involved.
2 3
Cases in New York have drawn a distinction between an actual arrest and a
mere investigation or identification when an officer believes a crime has been com-
mitted but does not have probable cause to make an arrest.2 4 Relying on United
States v. DiRe,25 to the effect that the state law as to arrest is determinative in the
absence of a federal statute, the court concluded that the police procedures did not
constitute an arrest. Mallory v. United States8 would not seem applicable, since it
concerned an illegal detention after arrest. Nevertheless, the court went on to find
no unreasonable delay, nor opportunity for coercion. What is most important in the
court's discussion of the arrest versus investigation problem is that defendants here
were not taken into custody, were not forced to go to the police station, and were
free to leave when they wished, as one defendant, Vito Genovese, actually did.
In justifying an "investigation" officers must show a reasonable belief that a
crime is in progress, and an absolute necessity for immediate investigation. 7 A more
difficult problem is presented in the court's determination that the questioning was
prompted by probable cause. Probable cause for arrest, a constitutional requirement,
has been held to exist "if the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as
to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been
committed." 28 The original impetus of the investigation in question came from the
questionable reputation of Joseph Barbara, based upon his previous conviction.
While this would probably not justify an investigation of a gathering at his home,
it seems that the element of flight, which was added at 2 p.m. when men were seen
running through, the woods near Barbara's estate, supplies the necessary confirma-
tion of suspicion.2 9 But before the flight took place, it is doubtful that the police
had reason to believe that a crime was in progress. Essentially, they knew only that
a large gathering was taking place at the home of a person who had previously
been convicted of a liquor violation, and that Barbara had associated with liquor
law violators since his conviction. If this constitutes probable cause for investigation
and identification of guests at Barbara's home, then it seems that police might pro-
perly "investigate" any large gathering of persons with questionable reputations
and prior convictions. That this is dangerously close to "roundup" techniques and
harassment seems apparent, whether defendants submit voluntarily to the investi-
gation or not. For this reason, it seems that all evidence obtained from defendants
questioned before the element of flight appeared was tainted by its basis of suspicion
without reasonable belief. On the other hand, the questioning after 2 p.m. was
adequately supported by probable cause, since flight generally confirms suspicion
enough to support not only investigation, but actual arrest.3
0
24 Hook v. State, 181 N.Y.S.2d 621 (Ct. CI. N.Y. 1958); People v. Yerman, 246 N.Y.S.
665 (Oneida County Ct. 1930). Federal cases lend some support to this doctrine. See Green
v. United States, 259 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1958). But see Henry v. United States, 361 U. S.
98 (1959), distinguished in the Bonanno case on grounds that the question of whether an ar-
rest occurred was not in issue.
25 332 U.S. 581 (1948).
26 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
27 Smith v. United States, 264 F.2d 469 (8th Cir. 1959); McCarthy v. United States, 264
F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1959). See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1948). Judge Kauf-
man, seeming to realize that the discussion of arrest versus investigation was something of a
pioneer venture into an undefined area of the law, discussed the quantum of probable cause
necessary to justify what he had already termed an investigation in terms of traditional prob-
able cause for arrest requirements. It is submitted that the distinction between arrest and in-
vestigation is valid, but that the probable cause necessary for investigation should be less than
that required to justify an arrest.
28 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1924).
29 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1948).
30 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160 (1948) ; Allen v. United States, 164 U. S. 492,
499 (1896); McCarthy v. United States, 264 F.2d 473 (8th Cir., 1959); Green v. United
States, 259 F.2d 180 (D.C. Cir., 1958). In each of these cases flight was the determinative
factor supporting probable cause for arrest. In Henry v. United States, 361 U. S. 98 (1959),
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Although the Bonanno trial has derived most of its publicity from its implemen-
tation of conspiracy theory, it seems that its long-range significance will be primarily
in the hazy area of arrest-search and seizure law. Judge Kaufman's instructions to
the jury on the conspiracy issue effectively delineate the specific meaning of the
crime, that is, a conspiracy to perjure and to obstruct justice by giving false, mis-
leading, and evasive testimony.-3 This essential nature of the crime fits easily into
the conspiracy statute, and can be criticized only by arguments against the doctrine
of conspiracy itself. But the Bonanno defendants were "investigated" on grounds
very close to bare suspicion, and the prosecution is apparently in a more precarious
position regarding this issue. A reversal of Bonanno on fourth amendment and
Mallory grounds is not improbable but, although it would allow some or all of the
defendants to go free, it would permit similar usage of the conspiracy theory in the
future.
GRAND JuRY - GRAND JURY REPORTS - GRAND JURY REPORT CRIrricAL OF
INDIVIDUALS IN THEm PRIVATE CAPACITY DISALLOWED - In September, 1958,
the Court of General Sessions for New York County empaneled a grand jury to
investigate the -manner in which certain television quiz programs had been con-
ducted. The grand jury conducted its investigation over a period of nearly nine
months, during which time it examined over two hundred witnesses. Finding that
no crime had been committed, the grand jury failed to return any indictment. It
did, however, tender to the court a report of its findings and recommendations.
Counsel, representing various television interests, moved to suppress the report on
the grounds that it was beyond the grand jury's authority to file such a report. Held:
Motion granted. Where private citizens are involved, the function of the grand
jury ends when it determines that no crime has been committed. In re Grand Jury
Report Concerning Investigation, 193 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1959).
There is no question about the power of a grand jury to inquire into irregular
conditions in the community and to return an indictment after determining that
there is cause to believe that a crime has been committed. Nor is there any dispute
about its power to inquire into and report on the status of public institutions.
Difficult questions arise, however, when the grand jury goes beyond this and renders
reports which are critical of individuals for conduct which, although below gen-
erally accepted standards of behavior, is not violative of the criminal law. With an
increasing frequency, reports of this type, which are presented to the court to be
placed on record, have been challenged as exceeding the authority of the grand
jury.,
The exact limits of the grand jury's power to issue reports are not clear and
vary from state to state. In a few jurisdictions the matter is specifically covered by
statute.2 But in the great number of states the legislature has either been silent on
the Court found no probable cause for arrest indicating that the defendants' "movements in
the car had no mark of fleeing-men or men acting furtively."
31 In order to find guilt, the jury had to find an agreement between two or more persons,
including the defendants, to act in concert to give false, evasive, or misleading testimony be-
fore a federal grand jury. They had to find, in addition, some overt act toward the object of
the conspiracy, and the overt act had to be a positive one, an actual giving of testimony of
a tainted nature; mere silence was not enough. Instructions to the jury, pp. 15, 18; 19a, 23,
24, 33a, 44a, 139.
1 The method most frequently used to challenge grand jury reports is the motion to
expunge which is directed to the court by persons criticized or prejudicially affected by a
report. E.g., Ex parte Cook, 199 Ark. 1187, 137 S.W.2d 248 (1940). Libel actions against
grand jurors provide another source of litigation over the legality of these reports. See Ap-
plication of United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858, 866 n. 26
(S.D.N.Y. 1953) for a collection of cases.
2 See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. § 15:210 (1951): "the grand jury shall not, in any case
whatever, make any report on any matter submitted to it for investigation ... as the grand
RECENT DECISIONS
the subject or sufficiently equivocal so as to allow the courts to follow their own
policy, either under the guise of statutory construction3 or by purporting to follow
the common law.*
Grand juries apparently exercised some sort of reportorial powers at common
law.5 However, the origin and scope of these powers are obscure0 It is sufficient
for the purpose of this comment to say that whatever the common law powers were,
they have largely fallen into disuse in this country.7
In those jurisdictions where grand jury reports are not adequately covered
by statute, some courts hold that a grand jury- has no authority to issue a report
commenting on the character of conduct of any person unless it is followed by an
indictment.8 Other courts have allowed reports which were critical of public of-
ficials.9 In these cases the dominant consideration appears to be that official laxity
and indifference should be exposed even though it does not amount to an indictable
offense. 10 Many official acts and omissions that are barely within the shadow of
legality are as prejudicial to the community welfare as conduct which is unques-
tionably criminal. Admittedly the legislature or executive branches of government
have the power to investigate and remedy such conditions, but these powers are
seldom exercised." In only a few cases has a private individual who has been
criticized in a grand jury report been unsuccessful in an effort to have the offending
report expunged.1
2
The major objection to the grand jury report is that it accuses without pro-
viding an opportunity to reply.'3 While accusations by reports are technically dif-
ferent from accusations by indictment, to members of the community they carry
the same stigma while depriving the person criticized of the indictment's principal
attribute: a forum to answer his accuser.' 4 This objection is fortified by the fact
that when a report is filed, it becomes a matter of public record, thus presumably
conferring upon the press and other media of communication a privilege to publish
jury is an accusatory body and not a censor of public morals." See also Edgar, The Propriety
of the Grand Jury Report, 34 TEXAS L. REV. 746, 747 (1956) for a current compilation of
statutes.
3 In re Jones, 101 App. Div. 55609, 92 N.Y.S. 275 (1905).
4 Matter of Quinn, 5 Misc. 2d 466, 166 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1957).
5 English grand juries as far back as the seventeenth century reported on such matters
of public concern as abusive marketing practices, horseracing, cockfighting, the use of false
drink measures by innkeepers, and the maintenance of bridges. Kuh, The Grand Jury "Pre-
sentment": Foul Blow or Fair Play? 55 COLUm. L. REV. 1103, 1109-10 (1955).
6 See Edgar, supra note 2 at 747.
7 4 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 471 (1956).
8 Bennett v. Kalamazoo Circuit Judge, 183 Mich. 200, 150 N.W. 141 (1914); In re
Grand Jury Report, 204 Wis. 409, 235 N.W. 789 (1931). For a collection of cases dealing
with the grand jury report see instant case at 560-62.
9 In re Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury, 10 N.J. 23, 89 A.2d 416 (1952);
In re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Fla. 189, 11 So.2d 316 (1943); In re Jones, 101 App.
Div. 55609, 92 N.Y.S. 275 (1909).
10 See, e.g., In re Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury, supra note 9.
11 Id. at 65, 89 A.2d at 443.
12 Hayslip v. State, 193 Tenn. 643, 249 S.W.2d 882 (1952). Hayslip, a public school
teacher, had instigated a grand jury investigation with allegations of immoral practices in the
local high schools. The grand jury found the charges to be without foundation and incor-
porated in its report a statement that Hayslip's continual employment in city schools would
be unadvisable. See also Application of Knights, 176 Misc. 635, 28 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1941)
where the court refused to expunge a report critical of an attorney who had also instigated a
grand jury investigation ,with unfounded charges. It is not clear from the opinion whether
Knight was or was not a public official.
13 See Judge Woodward's dissent in In re Jones, 101 App. Div. 55609, 92 N.Y.S. 275, 277
(1905).
14 People v. McCabe, 148 Misc. 330, 266 N.Y.S. 363, 367 (1933).
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matters contained in it without subjecting them to liability for defamation.15
The second major objection to these reports stems from the aura of solemnity
which the public mind attaches to utterances of the grand jury. The public regards
the grand jury as a deliberate body which carefully weighs all evidence before
making accusations.16 Because it occupies this position of dignity and respect, much
more weight is given to charges made by the grand jury than is given similar charges
made by a private individual.1 7 Therefore, a person is at a distinct disadvantage
in meeting such accusations.
On the basis of what has been said earlier, a distinction can be made between
grand jury reports relating to private individuals and those pertaining to public
officials. While courts are uniform in condemning the former,' s some will permit
the latter.' 9 The instant court labeled the proferred report as one relating to private
persons engaged in a private enterprise and applied the law accordingly. However,
it could be urged that officials of the television industry more properly fall into the
old common law category of persons engaged in a business affected with a public
interest, such as innkeepers, ferrymen, millers, and common carriers.20 Because
of the unique position from which they can exercise control over the "public intel-
lect," the line of cases dealing with public officials would appear more appropriate
to determine the reportorial powers of the grand jury when investigating the in-
dustry.
2 1
However, it is doubtful that the instant court would have decided differently
had the distinction been urged upon it. The court did not pass on the legality of
reports concerning public officials. Nevertheless, it was clear in holding that the
grand jury's function was to ascertain the incidence of crime and "not to censure
or criticize generally public morals or business ethics.
' 22
This comment has been limited to a discussion of a few of the most frequently
advanced policy considerations favoring or disapproving grand jury- reports. In
closing it might be well to focus attention on the fundamental issue in all of these
cases. That is, is the investigation and exposure of noncriminal wrongdoing an
appropriate function for the grand jury? It would seem not. For the grand jury
to perform such a function would in effect make it an arm of the legislature. What-
ever benefit would be derived from directing public and official attention to quasi-
criminal activities in the community would probably be counterbalanced by a de-
cline in the grand jury's efficiency as a law enforcement agency.
Thomas Kavadas, Jr.
JAPAN - CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - AMERICAN ARMED FORCES STATIONED IN JAPAN
NOT VIOLATION OF JAPANESE CONSTITUTION. - Seven Japanese left-wing unionists
and students demonstrating against the extension of runways to accommodate jet
planes were arrested and charged in a Japanese court with trespassing on an Ameri-
can military base near Tokyo.' A Tokyo court ruled that the criminal law under
15 But see Parsons v. Age-Herald Publishing Co., 181 Ala., 439, 61 So. 345 (1913) where
it was held that a privilege did not attach to a newspaper's publication of matter contained
in an extralegal grand jury report.
16 See Comment, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 711, 717 (1954).
17 See Application of United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, 111 F. Supp. 858,
861 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
18 See cases cited supra note 8.
19 See cases cited supra note 9.
20 See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1877).
21 Cf. Kuh, supra note 5, at 1123.
22 193 N.Y.S.2d 553, 571 (1959).
1 New York Times, Dec. 16, 1959, p. 19, col. 4.
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which the charges were brought violated article 31 of the constitution of Japan2
since the stationing of American armed forces in Japan was contrary to the consti-
tutional command not to maintain "war potential." 3 On direct appeal to the Jap-
anese Supreme Court, held:
mhe original verdict which ruled that the stationing of United States forces
in Japan is in violation of the [peace clause] of the Constitution, exceeded
the authority given to a court of justice to conduct judicial examinations
and is a misinterpretation of the [peace] clause and of the preamble of the
constitution. Accordingly, the original judgment which negated the validity
of article 2 of the Special Criminal Law under such an assumption was im-
proper.4
State v. Sunakawa, Supreme Court of Japan (Dec. 15, 1959).
This case presented to the Supreme Court of Japan emotion-packed political
issues5 interlaced with international and diplomatic implications.' The court in its
decision acted not unlike our own Supreme Court.
The history of Japan as a sovereign nation begins at least seven centuries be-
fore the birth of Christ.7 But it was not until during its rise to world power, follow-
ing the Perry expedition of 1853, that a constitution was promulgated by the Em-
peror MeijL8 It should not be assumed that the constitution served the same func-
tion as ours,9 nor was the judiciary independent.' 0 During the second World War
it was claimed that the Meiji constitution was at least partially responsible for the
chauvinistic and militaristic spirit of Japan?'
After the surrender a second American military figure played a major role in
the changing Japan. General MacArthur was given the task of occupying and re-
storing the country to the community of nations.
It was during this time of revolutionary flux' 2 that the present constitution of
Japan was enacted. Officially a revision 3 of the Meiji constitution, it was the anti-
thesis of that document, patterned largely after the United States Constitution. The
people were said to be the source of sovereignty.' 4 Individuals were protected by one
of the most comprehensive cataloguing of civil rights in existence? 5 The difficulty
created by the historical role of the Emperor was solved by making him only the
2 "No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be
imposed, except according to procedure established by law." JAPAN CONST. art. 31 in 2
PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 514 (2d ed. 1956).
3 JAPAN CONST. art. 9 in 2 PEASLEE, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 512.
4 Department of State, American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan, translated copy of summary
of the opinions in the case prepared and released by the Japanese Supreme Court, hereafter
cited as State v. Sunakawa.
5 New York Times, Dec. 27, 1959, § IV, p. 4, col. 6 reports that opposition to rearmament
has caused riots and is still a powerful force in Japanese politics.
6 During this period Premier Kishi was negotiating a new security treaty with the United
States. New York Times, Dec. 17, 1959, p. 36, col. 2.
7 2 PEASLuE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 508; M.AI, JAPANE SE MILITAItSM 95 (1945). "Ac-
cording to Japanese chronology, Jimmu Tenno ascended the throne on a date corresponding to
February 11, 660 B.C., the year 1 in Japanese chronology. The present emperor, Hirohito, is
the 124th occupant of the throne and is descended in an unbroken line from Jimmu."
8 Quiegly, Japan's Constitutions: 1890 and 1947, 41 Am. POL. SCI. Rav. 865, 867 (1947);
Blakemore, Post-War Developments in Japanese Law, 1947 Wis. L. Rlv. 632, 637-39; Maki,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 114-22, 155-81.
9 The Constitution was declared to be a gift from the Emperor to his subjects. Its'pri-
mary function was to officially set up and strengthen the position of the Emperor. The docu-
ment had been patterned largely after German-Prussian models. Ibid.
10 "[I]n the past the judges in Japan were civil servants under the Ministry of Justice."
Oppler, The Reform of Japan's Legal and Judicial System under Allied Occupation, 24 WASH.
L. Rav. 290, 299-300; Mad, op. cit. supra note 7, at 180-81.
11 Maki, op. cit. supra note 7, at 114-22, 155-81.
12 VAN ADUARD, JAPAN FROM SURRENDER TO PEACE 27-57 (1953).
13 Oppler, op. cit. supra note 10, at 297.
14 "The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people deriving
his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.," JAPAN CONST.
art. 1 in 2 PEASLEE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 511.
15 JAPAN CONST. arts. 10-40 in 2 PEASLEE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 512-15.
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"symbol of the state." ' A separation of powers was established,' 7 and the Supreme
Court was specifically given the power "to determine the constitutionality of any
law, order, regulation or official act.",'8
The preamble to the constitution demonstrated a new motivating spirit with
the emphasis on peace in the international community.' 9 This spirit was carried out
by the enactment of article 9 which provides:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and or-
der, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the
nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international dis-
putes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea,
and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The
right of belligerency of the State will not be recognized. (Emphasis added).2o
Perhaps the two atomic bombs which exploded over Japan were reflected in these
provisions. It is more likely that the change was imposed by General MacArthur,2
but reports indicate that the constitution has now been accepted by the Japanese peo-
ple.22 Tremendous and rapid changes must have taken place in Japan to give rise to
the controversy in Sunakawa, since only a few years before, the country had been told
that "war is father to culture." 23
The Supreme Court of Japan is the apex of its judiciary. Like our Supreme
Court, it also requires a case or controversy before acting.2 4 The court first ana-
16 See text cited supra note 14.
17 The Diet shall be the highest organ of state power, and shall be the sole
law-making organ of the State. [art. 41]
Executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet. [art. 65]
The whole judicial power is vested in a supreme court and in such inferior
courts as are established by law. [art. 76]
JAPAN CONST. arts. 41, 65, 76 in 2 PEASLEE, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 515, 517, 519.
18 JAPAN CONST. art. 81 in 2 PEASLEE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 519.
19 Portions of the preamble provide: "[wle shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the
fruits of peaceful co-operation with all nations .... We, the Japanese people, desire peace
for all time .... [W]e have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the
justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world .... We desire to occupy an honored
place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace .... We recognize that
all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace ... " JAPAN CONST. preamble in 2
PEASLEE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 511.
20 JAPAN CONST. art. 9 in 2 PEASLEE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 512.
21 A realist would point out that the constitution was promulgated November 3, 1946
during a time of military occupation. It has been reported that the new constitution had been
drafted by Major General Cortney Whitney "and presented to the Japanese diet as a Govern-
ment-supported draft." Dionisopoulos, The No-War Clause in the Japanese Constitution, 31
IND. L. J. 437, 438 (1956).
22 New York Times, Dec. 27, 1959, § IV, p. 4, col. 6; Tabata, Two Treatises on Japanese
Constitution, 1 DosHISHA L. REV. 23 (1956); Tanaka, Peace and Justice: Japan's Place in
the Family of Nations, 38 A.B.A.J. 663 (1952).
23 Okamoto, War-Thought, 2 DOsHISHA L. REV. 52 (1957).
24 The Chief Justice of the Japanese Supreme Court, Kotaro Tanaka, has pointed out:
The new system in Japan differs from the prewar one in that now
courts can take up the question of constitutionality in regard to laws and
other public acts -in this we have followed the United States model. The
United States Federal Supreme Court has the right to decide on constitu-
tionality but this right can be invoked only when concrete controversies
arise as to rights and obligations. A case on constitutionality is subject to
the system of instances just like any other case.
DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 48 (1956).
It is reported that the Supreme Court of Japan applied this principle in dismissing the
suit of a politician who sought a determination of the constitutionality of all laws and regula-
tions for the establishment and maintenance of a National Police Reserve. A decision as to
the meaning of the peace clause was thus avoided. Suzuki v. State, 6 Supreme Court 783
(1952) in Nathanson, Constitutional Adjudication in Japan, 7 AM. J. ComP. L. 195, 196-97
(1958).
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lyzed the peace provision's inhibition of "war potential." After pointing to the na-
tional acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation, the preamble and "the peace clause
of the constitution, it was stated that Japan has renounced war and the maintenance
of war potential.25 "It goes without saying," said the Court, "that this does not in
the least negate the inherent right of self-defense of this country, as a sovereign
state." 28
The lower court had held that Japan could only request the aid of the Security
Council and other organs of the United Nations. But the Supreme Court declared
the nation could choose "measures that are deemed appropriate in the light of ex-
isting international situation, so long as they are suitable as security measures for
maintaining the peace and security of this country." 2 7 It followed that the peace
clause of the constitution did not forbid requesting security forces from foreign coun-
tries.28 The Court observed that the constitutional command against maintaining
war potential was intended to prevent Japan from starting aggressive wars. Even
if war potential for defensive purposes be forbidden, the phrase included only that
which "Japan can command and supervise as a chief component, namely [Japan's]
own war potential." 29
The second portion of the opinion examined the constitutionality of the Security
Treaty3 O between the United States and Japan because the stationing of American
armed forces was pursuant to this document. Japan had reacquired its sovereignty
following the San Francisco Peace Conference when the Peace Treaty3 ' and the
companion Security Treaty were debated and accepted by the Japanese Diet, rati-
fied by the government, and signed by the Emperor on November 19, 1951.
After alluding to this history the Supreme Court indicated that the Security
Treaty was extremely important in the nation's reacquisition of sovereignty and
therefore "highly political in nature." 32 Unless its unconstitutionality was "patently
apparent" the question of its validity should be left to other means of political ex-
pression.
33
The decision concluded with the statement that the American armed forces,
not controlled by Japan,3 4 had as their goal the maintenance of international peace
in the Far East, and the protection of Japan against foreign attacks and internal
disorder.3 5 These conditions were found not to be clearly inconsistent with the peace
clause.38 A challenge of the Administrative Agreement37 because it had not been
specifically approved by the Diet was also rejected.38 The Court then held that the
trial judge had exceeded his authority and misinterpreted the peace clause of the
constitution.
One point of the opinion seems clear; the district court judge had misinter-
25 State v. Sunakawa, 1.




30 Security Treaty with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, [1952] 3 U.S. Treaties and Other Interna-
tional Agreements 3329.
31 Multilateral Peace Treaty, Sept. 8, 1951, [1952] 3 U.S. Treaties and Other Interna-
tional Agreements 3169.
32 State v. Sunakawa, 4.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Id. at 4-5.
36 The Court said: "[T]he stationing of United States armed forces in Japan is consistent
with the purport of article 9, and it cannot be discerned that the stationing of United States
armed forces in Japan constitutes a clear violation of the Constitution and is therefore invalid."
Id. at 5.
37 Administrative Agreement with Japan, Feb. 28, 1952, [1952], 3 U. S. Treaties and
Other International Agreements 3341.
38 State v. Sunakawa, 5.
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preted the constitution. Japan has the inherent right of self-defense and can there-
fore request foreign military aid for security purposes. Even if Japanese war po-
tial for defense is barred, the American forces are not such potential because
they are not controlled by Japan. This interpretation of the unique peace
clause seems to be an abandonment of the original idealistic dream. Different
interpretations of the clause had been advocated. Some were purely pacifistics9
while others more realistically relied on the concept of self-preservation. 40 The
reality of the cold war had in fact forced the partial abandonment of the dream by
other arms of the Japanese government."'
The second point of the opinion raises some problems. Apparently the lower
court "exceeded the authority given to a court of justice to conduct judicial exami-
nations" when it decided that the Security Treaty was unconstitutional. This seems
difficult to reconcile with the power of the judiciary "to determine the constitution-
ality of any law, order, regulation or official act." 42 Dictum in a United States Su-
preme Court case discussing the nature of political questions is helpful:
There are many illustrations in the field of our conduct of foreign relations,
where there are 'considerations of policy, considerations of extreme magni-
tude, and certainly, entirely incompetent to the examination and decision of
a court of justice.' 43
Judges have usually entered the area of international or foreign affairs with caution.4'
In the Sunakawa case, in addition to the complicating element of foreign re-
lations, was the fact that Japan had reacquired its sovereignty partly as the result
of the treaty which was being challenged. After scanning the treaty and finding it
not patently unconstitutional the validity of its enactment was left to the more
political arms. Because the district court had entered this political area it exceeded
its judicial authority.
39 Tabata, Two Treatises on Japanese Constitution, I DoSHisHA L. Rav. 23 (1956).
40 Tanaka, Peace and Justice: Japan's Place in the Family of Nations, 38 A.B.A.J. 663
(1952).
41 On July 8, 1950, General MacArthur asked the Japanese government to take measures
for the maintenance of domestic peace and order. This was the beginning of a skeleton armed
force for Japan. By 1955 the total authorized strength of the Defense Agency was "195,810
men, including 179,769 uniformed self-defense forces men and 16,041 civilians." MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JAPAN, A REviEW OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE STRENGTH 5 (1956). See Dioni-
sopoulos, The No-War Clause in the Japanese Constitution, 31 IND. L. J. 437 (1956) for the
various fictions used to ignore the inhibitions of article 9.
42 JAPAN CONST. art. 81 in PEASLEE, Op. cit. supra note 2, at 519.
43 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433, 455 (1939). See HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 192, 194-97 (1953).
44 Mr. Justice Douglas has written:
Once the dispute coming before the court is seen to lie in [the diplomatic]
field, judges would act improvidently if they laid hold of it. Lawsuits and
diplomatic exchanges are oil and water that do not mix. When a dispute
concerns foreign affairs . . . judges are not competent to act, or, if com-
petent, are likely to do more harm than good in trying to intervene.
DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 55 (1956).
A dramatic illustration of judicial reluctance was recently given by our Supreme Court in
Wilson v. BohIender, 361 U.S. 281 (1960). The Government had argued in its brief that
petitioner could be court-martialled, under the war powers, because Berlin was still occupied
territory. It concluded with the following:
Since the position that Berlin is still occupied territory has been taken and
is now being taken by this country in the conduct of its foreign relations, we
close by noting the long line of cases which hold that the courts will be
most slow to go contrary to a definite position taken in foreign affairs by
the executive vis-a-vis a foreign country, so as not 'to embarrass the execu-
tive arm in its conduct of foreign affairs.' Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,
324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945); Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 33
U.S. 103, 111 (1948); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
Brief for Respondent, p. 23, Wilson v. Bohlender, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
The Court avoided a decision on this issue by pointing out that the "war powers" had not
been relied upon below. 361 U.S. 283, n. 2.
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This approach was not unlike that taken by our Supreme Court in the Girard
case,45 which arose out of the controversy between Japan and the United States as
to who should try the soldier for the killing of a Japanese civilian. The same Security
Treaty and Administrative Agreement were involved. In a brief per curiam opinion,
after finding no constitutional or statutory barriers, the Court felt that "the wisdom
of the arrangement is exclusively for the determination of the executive and legis-
lative branches."" A secondary question was raised in both Sunakawa and Girard;
it concerned the validity of the administrative agreement which had not been offi-
cially ratified by the Japanese Diet or the United States Senate. In their decision
finding the agreement constitutional both Courts47 referred to article 3 of the rati-
fied Security Treaty4s authorizing the making of further arrangements.
Although Japan borrowed most of its law from the civil law countries,49 in the
area of constitutional law, it seems to have turned to the United States, probably
because of the MacArthur occupation. Their Supreme Court appears to be function-
ing like our own. The way it handled the constitutional challenge of the treaty is
justified in a government where a true separation of powers exists.50 In interpreting
the peace clause it is obvious that the present international situation was reflected
in the decision. The court was also careful not to give the clause a strict interpre-
tation which would have prevented the flexibility and adaptation required of a use-
ful constitution. There is language in the opinion which will permit its adaptation
to changing conditions, whether those conditions require pacifism or more active
military preparations. Joseph A. Marino
MILITARY LAw - DuB PRocEss - ADMINISTRATIVELY DETERMINED Dis-
CHARGE WITHOUT HEARING VIoLATEs DUE PRocass. - Fannie Mae Clackum, on
active duty in the United States Air Force in 1951, was interrogated by her com-
manding officer and a representative of the Office of Special Investigations (OSI)
concerning homosexuality. She denied any knowledge of the matters alleged, but
was repeatedly interviewed by the OSI until January, 1952. When offered an op-
portunity to resign, she refused and demanded a court martial. She was discharged
on January 22, 1952, without having had a hearing and without having been
informed of the nature of the evidence against her. After her discharge was ap-
proved by the Air Force Discharge Review Board, Miss Clackum brought suit for
back pay, claiming that her discharge was illegal. Proceedings were suspended to
permit her to file an application before the Air Force Board for the Correction of
Military Records. Her application was denied, and the suspension of proceedings
was removed. On the defendant's motion to dismiss the petition, which the court
treated as a motion for summary judgment, held: denied. Clackum v. 'United
States, Ct.CI. No. 246-56 (1960).
The court conceded that the Air Force could have discharged the plaintiff at
any time and for any reason. But the character of the discharge given her was
considered penal in nature; the court said it could not be imposed "without re-
spect for even the most elementary notions of due process of law.":' But, undertaking
45 Wilson v. Girard, 354 U. S. 524 (1957).
46 Id. at 530.
47 Id. at 528; State v. Sunakawa, 5.
48 "The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States
of America in and about Japan shall be determined by administration agreements between the
two governments." Security Treaty with Japan, Sept. 8, 1952, [1952] 3 U. S. Treaties and
Other International Agreements 3329. 3332.
49 See Takayanagi, Contact of the Common Law with the Civil Law in Japan, 4 Am. J.
Comp. L. 60 (1955).
50 See HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1-30 (1958).
1 Clackum v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 246-56, at 4.
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to review an administrative decision of the Secretary of the Air Force, the court
faced a jurisdictional problem. Relying solely upon Harmon v. Bruckner,2 the court
noted that not all the actions of executives of the armed forces with regard to the
discharge of servicemen are beyond review.3 In a case prior to Harmon, the Court
of Claims had held that a court martial was void, saying, "We have no
power to review court martial proceedings; we can give relief only if the court
martial was absolutely void and, therefore, forms no foundation for plaintiff's dis-
missal. If it was void, it is settled that we have jurisdiction to render judgment for
the pay of which he was illegally deprived.
' 4
The incidents of Miss Clackum's discharge were characterized by the court as
"penalties."5 There are five types of discharge granted by the Air Force.8 Three
may be given by administrative action: honorable; general, given under honorable
conditions; and undesirable, given under conditions less than honorable. A bad
conduct discharge may be given by either a general or special court martial. A
dishonorable discharge may be given by a general court martial.
A court martial is considered under Air Force Regulations 35-66(5) (b)
when a person charged with an offense under that section refuses to resign. The
Secretary of the Air Force, if conviction by a general court martial seems unlikely,
can administratively determine whether the discharge furnished should be honorable,
general, or undesirable.
In the Clackum case the court said that a dishonorable discharge is one of the
most severe penalties that can be imposed by a court martial,
yet ... if the evidence ... is so insubstantial that a conviction by court
martial would be unlikely, the executive officers of the Air Force may
[under Air Force regulations] themselves convict the soldier and impose the
penalty.8
The court compared this procedure to authorizing a prosecuting attorney to per-
sonally impose sentence when he doesn't have enough evidence for a conviction.
The court does not argue that the undesirable discharge given to the plaintiff
was so similar in effect to a dishonorable discharge that it should not have been
administratively given, but considers instead the "dishonorable nature"9 of the
discharge, apparently treating an undesirable discharge under A.F.R. 35-66 as if it
were a dishonorable discharge because it would seem so to the public and to the
plaintiff's prospective employers. The veteran's benefits lost because of each are
substantially identical.10
The contention that less than honorable discharges are in effect dishonorable
has been made by the New York Supreme Court.'1 The court, granting a request
for review of a "discharge (not honorable)" from the New York Air National
Guard, said that such a proclamation impugns the character and reputation of a
citizen. The effect on a man's civilian life is the same whether done by an officer
or a board, and whether it results in a discharge described as "dishonorable" or
2 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
3 Harmon created no small amount of comment in holding subject to judicial review an
administrative discharge based on the serviceman's allegedly subversive activities before induc-
tion. See, e.g., MIL. L. Rav. 123 (April 1959); 70 HARV. L. REv. 533 (1957); 33 ST. JoXIN's
L. REV. 133 (1958).
4 Shapiro v. United States, 107 Ct. CL. 650, 69 F. Supp. 205, 207 (1947).
5 Ct. C1. No. 246-56 at 4, 6.
6 A.F.R. § 39-10 (14 Apr. 1959).
7 Plaintiff was discharged under A.F.R. 35-66 (12 Jan. 1951), which has been super-
seded by A.F.R. 35-66 (14 Apr. 1959).
8 Ct. Cl. No. 246-56, at 3-4.
9 Id. at 6.
10 57 MmH. L. REV. 130 (1958); 9 STAN. L. REv. 170 (1956).
11 Nistal v. Hausauer, 282 App. Div. 7, 121 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1953).
RECENT DECISIONS
"without honor." 12 In another case,"s the court after passing upon the validity
of the discharge, noted,
[A]n honorable discharge is an extremely valuable property right as well as
a personal right, and to deprive a person of an honorable discharge is to
deprive him of property rights, as well as civil rights and personal honor1 4
And again, "the honor and standing of the citizen in his home town .. . is not
a trifle."' 5
On the other hand, it has been said that an honorable discharge is a "formal
final judgment .. .that [the serviceman] .. .left the service in a status of honor."'-
And the argument is often made that the incidents of an honorable discharge are
not a matter of right, but must be earned. 17 The character of the discharge given
to a soldier upon termination of his enlistment, according to-this theory, should be
left to the discretion of the executive officer having the power to grant discharges.'8
The Govemment's contention, drawn in question in the Clackum case, is that
the procedure followed was necessary for an efficient military establishment. The
Court of Claims saw this as an attempt to "load [Miss Clackum] down with pen-
alties" 9 in violation of due process. No authority was cited for the proposition.
The opinion may also fairly be read to imply that the absence of confrontation was
a denial of the plaintiff's rights.20
The Supreme Court has apparently spoken to the contrary. In Reaves v.
Ainszorth,21 the court said, "For those in the military or naval service of the
United States the military law is due process. '2 2 In a later case, the court pointed
out that "the experience of our Government ... and of the English Government
. .. proves that a much more expeditious procedure is necessary in military than
is thought tolerable in civil affairs.1 23
Each of these opinions supported the proposition that administrative actions
of armed services executives, and decisions of courts martial are beyond judicial
scrutiny. Harmon v. Bruckner24 rejected this contention. The question remaining,
once the power of judicial review has been established, is whether the procedure
followed in Miss Clackum's discharge violated due process. The proposition ad-
vanced by the Court of Claims is not without its supporters.2 5
12 Id. at 12, 121 N.Y.S.2d at 716. But see Nistal v. Hausauer, 308 N.Y. 146, 154, 124
N.E.2d 94, 98 (1954), reversing: "This form of discharge is probably damaging to plaintiff'sreputation and to his prospects in life, but ours is a pure legal question only, as to whether or
not it can be reviewed by the civil courts."
13 United States ex rel. Roberson v. Keating, 121 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. Ill. 1949).
14 Id. at 479.
15 Ibid.
16 United States v. Kelly, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 34, 36 (1872).
17 United States v. Kingsley, 138 U.S. 87 (1891).
18 Reid v. United States, 161 Fed. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1908).
19 Ct. Cl. No. 246-56 at 4.
20 Id. at 6: "The so-called 'hearing' ... was not a hearing at all, in the usual sense ofthat word. . . .The appellant and her counsel were futilely tilting at shadows. However
vulnerable the secret evidence may have been, there was no possible way to attack it."
21 219 U.S. 296 (1911).
22 Id. at 304. But see Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
23 United States ex reL. Creary v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 336, 343 (1922).
24 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
25
The loyalty board convicts on evidence which it cannot even appraise. The
critical evidence may be the word of an unknown witness who is 'a paragon
of veracity, a knave, or the village idiot.' . . . The accused has no oppor-
tunity to show that the witness lied or was prejudiced or venal. Without
knowing who her accusers are she has no way of defending. She has noth-
ing to offer except her own word and the character testimony of her friends.
Douglas, J., concurring in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
180 (1951).
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The Air Force did a number of things which, it may be argued, violated plain-
tiff's rights. It in effect accused Miss Clackum of conduct which is a crime under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but did not notify her of this fact.26 Neither
the accusations nor the evidence upon which they were based were made known
to her or to her counsel prior to her discharge.
As in the Shapiro case,2 the relief requested, back pay, could be granted only
if the court held the original discharge invalid, but the effect of the decision is not
to reinstate the plaintiff in the Air Force. 28 Nevertheless, if this is to be the final
judicial determination of the case, it may affect future administrative determination
of discharges. The effects which it might have should be considered in the light of
recently changed Air Force regulations.
In a case such as Miss Clackum's, where a court martial is not deemed appro-
priate, the accused person is entitled to a hearing before a board of officers prior to
discharge.29 He may appear in person before the board with or without counsel.
He may request the appearance of any witness whose testimony he believes to be
pertinent to his case, and may cross-examine the witness.2 0 But "an investigative
report will not be made available to the respondent... or his counsel."'' Nor will
information which might compromise investigative sources, investigative
methods or the identity of confidential informants . . .be disclosed to mem-
bers of the board or to any person whose case is being considered .. .unless
authorized by the Director of Special Investigations... or higher authority.
3 2
The recommendations of the board are not binding upon the officer having
general discharge authority, but they limit him so that he may not order discharge
if the board recommends retention. Nor, where the board recommends discharge,
may he order a type of discharge inferior to the type imposed by the board. He
may, however, set aside the findings of the board as being inconsistent with the
facts, or set aside the recommendations as inconsistent with the findings, if he also
appoints a new board to hear the case.33 Only an honorable, general or undesirable
discharge may be administratively imposed."
The only significant change effected by the new regulations is that an accused
person has a right to a hearing prior to discharge at which he may call and question
witnesses. Where he does not know who his accusers are, this procedure will not
guarantee confrontation unless he is given permission to examine secret reports.
In Clackum, the court seemed more concerned with the fairness of the hearing than
with the fact that it followed the discharge. A case can still arise in which access
to the statements of petitioner's accusers are denied, thus creating a situation similar
to that in Clackum.
It is to be hoped that, in future cases, the distinction between undesirable and
dishonorable discharges will be more clearly drawn. Then it may be argued that
armed services regulations should be changed so that neither discharge may be
imposed in violation of due process.
James J. Harrington
26 Ct. Cl. No. 246-56 (1960) at 3.
27 Shapiro v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 650, 69 F. Supp. 205 (1947).
28 "LT]he sort of 'review' contemplated in an action to recover lost pay in the Court of
Claims is an original suit for a money judgment and not a review looking to the altera-
tion or correction of an official military record or to the compelling of official action by an
officer of an executive department." Friedman v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 364, 376 (Ct.
Cl. 1958).
29 A.F.R. 35-66 § 15 (14 Apr. 1959).
30 A.F.R. 35-66 § 20 (14 Apr. 1959).
31 A.F.R. 35-66 § 9 (14 Apr. 1959).
32 A.F.R. 35-66 § 9(a) (14 Apr. 1959).
33 A.F.R. 35-66 § 21(b) (14 Apr. 1959).
34 A.F.R. 39-10 (14 Apr. 1959).
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SEARCH AND SEIZURE - EVIDENCE - INFORMATION GIVEN STATE OFFICER BY
FBI AGENT Is NOT FEDERAL COOPERATION. - On March 15, 1958, petitioner was
arrested without a warrant in his uncle's home by police officers of the city of Mil-
waukee, Wisconsin. Pursuant to the arrest, a search was made and unwrapped
heroin was found on his person. On March 10, 1958 the arresting officer had been
informed by an FBI agent of narcotics activities at the residence where petitioner
was arrested. The residence had been under surveillance by city police prior to
tlis tip.
State charges were preferred against petitioner, but on motion the heroin evi-
dence was suppressed as being the result of an illegal search and seizure.' The
evidence thus suppressed was turned over to the federal authorities who obtained
an indictment. Petitioner was subsequently convicted in federal district court of
illegally possessing the heroin.2 He appealed on the grounds that the evidence
should have been suppressed because obtained through illegal search and seizure.
Held: Affirmed. Evidence illegally seized by state officials in a search in which
federal officers did not participate is admissible in prosecutions in federal courts.
United States v. Camara, 271 F.2d 787 (7th Cir. 1959).
Traditionally at common law the test for admissibility of evidence was its
trustworthiness and relevance 3 subject to certain exclusionary rules employed by
federal courts and some state courts.4. The federal courts have seen fit to employ
an exclusionary rule, explicitly formulated in Weeks v. United States,5 whereby
evidence which is obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure by federal
agents is inadmissible in federal courts.
6
In the Weeks case an illegal search was conducted by both state and federal
authorities. It was held that evidence obtained by the federal government was inad-
missible, while evidence seized by state officers could be admitted in federal courts.
The reason for the qualification in this exclusionary rule was that the fourth and fifth
amendments were thought to extend only "to the federal government and its
agencies." 7 Difficulty arose in the application of the rule when federal officers were
not directly involved in the search. Since Weeks stated that the exclusionary rule
applied only to the federal government, the courts would not inquire into the
propriety of the search unless federal officers had "participated" in the search. 8
Attempts to distinguish between federal and state searches has not been ac-
complished without some difficulty and inconsistency as to what degree of federal
participation will make the search a federal search. Nice distinctions between "par-
ticipation" and "cooperation" have been devised.9 In Byars v. United States0
1 Wisconsin has adopted the exclusionary rule for illegally seized evidence. See State v.
Drew, 217 Wis. 216, 257 N.W. 681 (1934).
2 64A STAT. 550, 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) (1954); INT. Rzv. CODE of 1954, § 7237.
3 1 WIG aORE, EVIDENCE § 10 (3d ed. 1940).
4 See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). For a table showing the states which
employ the federal exclusionary rule see the appendix to Justice Felix Frankfurter's opinion
at p. 33.
5 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
6 In that case the court expanded on the decision in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886). There it was held that the government could not force Boyd, by statute, to
produce his private papers to be used against him in a federal proceeding. Such a statute, it
was decided, would be in violation of defendant's constitutional rights guaranteed by the
fourth and fifth amendments to the Constitution.
7 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
8 Byars v. United States, 373 U.S. 28 (1927); see Kohn, Admissibility in Federal Court
of Evidence Illegally Seized by State Officers, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 236 for a discussion of
this rule as it developed in Center v. United States, 267 N.S. 575 (1925), Byars v. United
States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
9 In United States v. Scotti, 102 F. Supp. 747 (S.D. Tex. 1950) the court said:
The crux of (the) doctrine is that a search is a search by a federal official,
if he had a hand in it; it is not a search by a federal- official if evidence
secured by state authorities is turned over to the federal authorities on a
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federal officers accompanied the state officers on the search, remained during the
search, and illegally seized part of the evidence. The evidence was suppressed in the
federal court. The facts allowed the formulation of a narrow rule that the presence
and activity of the federal officers during the search was participation.
During the Prohibition era, when there was much cooperation between federal
and local officers in enforcing the federal prohibition laws, the federal courts took
a more liberal view of federal participation. In Gambino v. United States,"' al-
though no federal officers were present when the illegal search was conducted,
the fact that state officers were acting solely to enforce federal law was the basis for
concluding that the evidence must be suppressed.
Later cases relying on Gambino expanded federal cooperation to an even
broader area. In Fowler v. United States12 the fact that there was a general practice
and custom that state officers would act for the federal prohibition authorities by
seizing, and turning over to federal authorities, large quantities of illicit liquor,
rendered the evidence inadmissible. Such practice, the Court said, was a federal
ratification of the original illegal search and seizure. In Sutherland v. United
States"s a prior understanding that the federal government would accept evidence
which the state officers uncovered was deemed sufficient federal cooperation to
make inadmissible any illegally obtained evidence. The very fact that the evidence
presented in a federal court was seized by state officers had some effect on deciding
whether the evidence was to be excluded.
However, the modern trend has been to limit the idea of participation to active
participation by federal officers in an illegal search.1 4 Gambino, Fowler, and Suth-
erland are restricted to their facts or tacitly nullified.' 5 Proof of a pattern set by
custom, whereby incriminating evidence which will support a federal charge is
often turned over to federal officials by state officers, is no longer sufficient to prove
that the search is a federal search or one conducted on behalf of the federal govern-
ment.' 6 The fact that state and federal officers have acted together in the past will
no longer support a charge of participation or cooperation. 17 Where a federal
marshall notified city police of his suspicion that a state crime had been committed
the resulting search was not a federal activity,' and evidence uncovered thereby
was admitted in federal court. United States v. Moses'9 required, to support the
exclusion of the evidence, proof that the cooperation between state and federal
officers led to the illegal search and seizure.
In Camara, it was held that the FBI agent's tip to the Milwaukee city police
that narcotics users were frequenting the place subsequently searched was not suf-
ficient federal participation to require that the illegally seized evidence be suppressed.
silver platter. The decisive factor in determining the applicability of the
Byars case is the actuality of a share by a federal official in the total enter-
prise of securing and selecting evidence by other than sanctioned means. It
is immaterial whether a federal agent originated the idea or joined in it
while the search was in progress. So long as he was in it before the object
of the search was completely accomplished, he must be deemed to have
participated in it. Where there is participation on the part of the federal
officers it is not necessary to consider what would be the result if the search
had been conducted entirely by State officers.
10 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
11 275 U.S. 310 (1927)..
12 62 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1932).
13 92 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1937).
14 United States v. Scotti, 102 F. Supp. 747 (S.D. Tex. 1950).
15 See, e.g., Frederick v. United States, 208 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1953); Serio v. United
States, 203 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1953); Parker v. United States, 183 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1950).
16 Parker v. United States, 183 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1950).
17 Serio v. United Statps, 203 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1953).
18 Fredericks v. United States, 208 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1953).
19 234 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1956).
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Even though the city police acted on this tip, the illegal search and seizure was
conducted solely by them and the search was entirely state-conducted.
The court relied heavily on the Moses decision, but in doing so went beyond
the ruling to restrict the idea of federal participation or cooperation even further.
Not only must the federal agents' cooperation produce the illegal search to have
the evidence excluded, but federal officers may cooperate with state officers by sup-
plying them with information and tips of illegal activity. If such information leads
to unlawful seizures of evidence, the participation by federal officers will not be
a basis for excluding the evidence.
Thus the federal government has come full circle on the question of inter-
preting state searches. The test for federal participation in illegal state searches
now seems to be that a federal officer may inform state officials of activities violating
both state and federal laws and subsequently use evidence illegally obtained by
state officials in federal prosecutions so long as the federal officer does not actively
participate in the search itself.
On the basis of the application of the federal exclusionary rule to searches
by state officers as announced in Camara, the policy consideration on which this
exclusionary rule is founded is thwarted. The rule stems originally from an attempt
to safeguard the rights of citizens guaranteed in the fourth and fifth amendments.
20
Even if the guarantee of these rights is secure from federal action, the ruling in
Camara offers opportunity for federal officers, by collusion with state officers, to
violate constitutional rights. The rule can encourage federal officers to make sur-
reptitious pacts with local police to make illegal searches and seizures without fear
of the penalty imposed by the exclusionary rule and thus subvert the courts' at-
tempt to supervise federal officers.
21
The question of whether evidence illegally seized by state officers is admissible
in federal courts is presently pending before the Supreme Court. 2 The Courts of
Appeal admit evidence illegally seized by state officers23 with the notable exception
of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals which excludes all evidence with an
unconstitutional taint.2 When the Supreme Court does finally speak on this issue,
if the full implications of the Camara extension are considered, the court may very
likely adopt the more logical and realistic rule followed in the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals.
Cornelius J. Collins
TORTS - ATTRA~CTIv NUISANCE - IT Is FOR TRIER OF FACT TO DETERMINE
IF SWIMMING POOL IS A CTIVE NUISANCE. - Plaintiff's one and one-half year
old son drowned in defendant's private swimming pool. Decedent, prior to the date
of the accident, had on many occasions visited defendant's premises in the care of
the defendant's daughter who acted as his baby sitter. Neighborhood children
frequently congregated in the defendant's yard, attracted by both the pool and
20 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 382 (1914).
21 See justice Felix Frankfurter's dissent in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56
(1959).
22 Rios v. United States, 256 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 359 U.S. 965
(1959).
23 Costello v. United States, 255 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 830
(1958); Gaitan v. United States, 252 F.2d 256 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 937
(1958); Collins v. United States, 230 F.2d 424 (6th Cir. 1956); Fredericks v. United States,
208 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1019 (1954); Parker v. United States,
183 F.2d 268 (9th Cir. 1950); Wheatley v. United States, 158 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1946);
United States v. Diuguid, 146 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 857 (1945);
Miller v. United States, 50 F.2d 505 (3d Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 651 (1931).
24 Hanna v. United States, 260 F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See 34 NOTRE DAME LAW.
278 (1958) for a full discussoin of the Hanna decision.
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several animals kept there which were clearly visible and easily accessible from
the street. No one saw decedent enter the yard on the date of the accident. The
trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint. The district court of appeals
affirmed.' Held: reversed. The complaint states a cause of action under section 339
of the Restatement of Torts which has been adopted by California as the law with
respect to the liability of a landowner to trespassing children. King v. Lennen, 1
Cal. Rptr. 665 348 P.2d 98 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
As early as 1841, an English Court recognized that a property owner owed a
special duty of care to trespassing children who because of their age would not
recognize a concealed danger.2 The first recorded American cases adopting this
principle involved injuries to children on railroad turntables, the locks of which
had been negligently left open.3 From these decisions this special consideration for
trespassing children acquired the name "turntable doctrine."4? In California's first
case invoking the attractive nuisance doctrine, also involving a railroad turntable,
the court delineated the policy underlying the doctrine. It asserted: "In the forum
of law, as well as of common sense, a child of immature years is expected to exer-
cise only such care and self restraint as belongs to childhood, and a reasonable man
must be presumed to know this, and required to govern his actions accordingly." s
In spite of this broad statement, courts recognized that the unnecessary extension of
the policy would place an undue burden on property owners6 and the subsequent
history of the doctrine has been one of confinement to rather nebulously defined
settings and circumstances. Within these boundaries certain general ideas as to
what constitutes an attractive nuisance have emerged. One of the first formulations
of the attractive nuisance doctrine in California was that the condition must con-
stitute a "trap."'7 Originally the "trap" theory was applied only to dangerous ma-
chinery and occasionally to other artificial conditions created by an affirmative act
of the property owner." It was generally concluded that the condition had to be
one that children would not recognize as being dangerous. 9 This premise resulted
in a distinction by the courts between conditions harboring concealed dangers and
those the inherent dangers of which were presumed to be recognized by all, regard-
less of age. Among the latter conditions have been included fire, water, and
heights.10 This presumption of the knowledge of even small children of the dangers
inherent in water has given rise to the widely accepted position that ponds, pools,
lakes, streams, reservoirs and other bodies of water are not, in their ordinary condi-
tion, attractive nuisances,"- even though they may be artificially constructed.1 2 This
idea repeatedly has been accepted by the California courts 3 and has been applied
1 King v. Lennon, 342 P.2d 459 (Cal. App. 1959).
2 Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q.B., 113 Eng. Rep. 1041 (1841). Child injured while playing on
a negligently loaded cart that had been left in the street.
3 Sioux 'City & Pacific R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873); Keffe v. Mil-
waukee & St. Paul R.R., 21 Minn. 207, 18 Am. Rep. 393 (1875).
4 See generally Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 427 (1959).
5 Barrett v. Southern Pacific Co., 91 Cal. 296, 27 Pac. 666, 667 (1891).
6 PROSSER, TORTS 439 (2d ed. 1955).
7 Sanchez v. East Contra Costa Irr. Co., 205 Cal. 515, 271 Pac. 1060 (1928); Faylor
v. Great Eastern Quick Silver Mining Co., 45 Cal. App. 194, 187 Pac. 101 (1919).
8 Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 47 Pac. 113 (1896); Beeson v. Los Angeles, 115 Cal.
App. 123, 300 Pac. 993 (1931); Bransom v. Labrot, 81 Ky. 638, 50 Am. Rep. 193 (1884).
9 Malendez v. City of Los Angeles, 8 Cal. 2d 741, 68 P.2d 971 (1937); Beeson v. Los
Angeles, 115 Cal. App. 123, 300 Pac. 993 (1931).
10 Malendez v. City of Los Angeles, 8 Cal. 2d 741, 68 P.2d 971 (1937); Demmer v.
Eureka, 78 Cal. App. 2d 708, 178 P.2d 472 (1947); Beeson v. Los Angeles, 115 Cal. App.
123, 300 Pac. 993 (1931); Polk v. Laurel Hill Cemetery Ass'n, 37 Cal. App. 624, 174 Pac.
414 (1918).
11 56 Am. JUR. WATERS § 436 (1947).
12 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 29(12)j (1950).
13 Malendez v. City of Los Angeles, 8 Cal. 2d 741, 68 P.2d 971 (1937); Peters v. Bow-
man, 115 Cal. 345, 47 Pac. 113 (1896); Ward v. Oakely, 125 Cal. App. 2d 840, 271 P.2d
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to swimming pool cases quite similar to King to defeat recovery.14 The courts have
mitigated the results of the water presumption somewhat by holding that the ex-
istence of a deceptive condition belying the innocent appearance of the accepted
water hazard, would make the artificial water condition a "trap" and hence an
attractive nuisance.'5
California courts have adopted the Restatement rule, promulgated in 1934,16
respecting attractive nuisances and have used it in water cases while maintaining
that no conflict exists between it and the trap theory.17 There has been speculation
in other jurisdictions that the Restatement rule could conceivably give a much
broader base to the liability of landowners to trespassing children than did the older
theories.1
8
While comment (b) to section 339 provides that the section is not to apply
... to those conditions the existence of which is obvious even to children and the
risk of which is fully realized by them," it is also true that the courts are left to
their discretion in determining what these "conditions" are. As already mentioned,
fire, water, and falling from a height have been the traditional conditions included
within comment (b).19 The courts have often applied it to defeat recovery even
where the injured party has been so young that it would be absurd to suppose that
he possessed knowledge of the danger.
20
So unreasonable has been this presumption in many instances that the Cali-
fornia courts in recent decisions have shown a tendency to relax the rule some-
what.2 1 In Reynolds v. Willson, 22 the California Supreme Court ruled that a par-
536 (1954); Demmer v. Eureka, 78 Cal. App. 2d 708, 178 P.2d 472 (1947); King v.
Simons Brick Co., 52 Cal. App. 2d 586, 126 P.2d 627 (1942); Beeson v. Los Angeles, 115
Cal. App. 123, 300 Pac. 993 (1931); Polk v. Laurel Hill Cemetery Ass'n, 37 Cal. App. 624,
174 Pac. 414 (1918).
14 Wilford v. Little, 144 Cal. App. 2d 477, 301 P.2d 282 (1956); Lake v. Ferrer, 139
Cal. App. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 104 (1956).
15 E.g., Sanchez v. East Contra Costa Irr. Co., 205 Cal. 515, 271 Pac. 1060 (1928):
The court held that the existence of a syphon on the floor of a canal, concealed by muddy
waters, constituted a trap - that the child had accepted the dangers of the water but not
those of the artificially constructed syphon.
16 RESTATamENT, ToRTS § 339 (1934):
A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to young children
trespassing thereon caused by a structure or other artificial condition
which he maintains upon the land, if (a) the place where the condition
is maintained is one upon which the possessor knows or should know that
such children are likely to trespass, and (b) the condition is one of which
the possessor knows or should know and which he realizes or should realize
as involving an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such
children, and (c) the children because of their youth do not discover the
condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming
within the area made dangerous by it, and (d) the utility to the possessor
of maintaining the condition is slight as compared to the risk to young chil-
dren involved therein.
Courtell v. McEachen, 51 Cal. 2d 448, 334 P.2d 870 (1959); Reynolds v. Wilson, 51 Cal.
2d 94, 331 P.2d 48 (1958); Davis v. Goodrich, 171 A.C.A. 88, 340 P.2d 48 (1959); Garcia
v. Soogian, 52 A.C. 107, 338 P.2d 433 (1959); Woods v. San Francisco, 148 Cal. App. 2d
958, 307 P.2d 698 (1957). See generally Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CALIF. L. Rzv.
427 (1959).
17 Long v. Standard Oil Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 455, 207 P.2d 837 (1949).
18 16 FORDHAm L. Rav. 295 (1947).
19 PRossER, ToRTs 441 (2d ed. 1955).
20 Wilford v. Little, 144 Cal. App. 2d 477, 301 P.2d 282 (1956); Lake v. Ferrer, 139
Cal. App. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 104 (1956).
21 Courtell v. McEachen, 51 Cal. 2d 448, 334 P.2d 870 (1959); Reynolds v. Willson,
51 Cal. 2d 94, 331 P.2d 48 (1958); Davis v. Goodrich, 171 A.C.A. 88, 340 P.2d 48 (1959).
In Davis, a child, two and one-half years old, fell from an abandoned roller coaster. The court
stated: "However, when dealing with a child of plaintiff's tender years, it cannot be stated
as a matter of law that he either did or did not have sufficient mental development to fully
appreciate the consequences of a fall from a high elevation .... Under such circumstances,
this determination would ordinarily be a question for the trier of fact." Judgment was for the
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tially filled pool, the bottom of which was covered with algae, dead leaves, and
other decomposed matter, satisfied condition (c) of section 33923 and constituted
a trap. A two-year-old boy was seriously injured when he fell into the pool and
apparently was unable to extricate himself because of the slippery bottom. A strong
dissent by Mr. Justice Spence pointed out the inconsistency of this holding with
prior attractive nuisance cases,24 emphasizing the Summary of California Law25
statement that it is only "where the natural or artificially created body of water
contains an additional artificial contrivance constituting a concealed danger or
trap [that] recovery may be allowed." 26 In Courtell,' where a little girl was injured
when her dress caught fire, the court extended the application of the Restatement
rule by holding that it was for the trier of fact to determine whether or not the
girl had been injured by a risk not open and obvious to her. There was a dispute
as to whether or not open flames had been visible, but no dispute as to the existence
of smoldering live coals. Though the case was reversed because of faulty instructions
to the jury and there was the added problem of a violation of a fire control ordi-
nance, the dicta in the case shows a limiting of the concept that young children
presumably are aware of the dangers under these conditions.
Each of these cases indicated the California Supreme Court's tendency to re-
assess some long-held concepts regarding the attractive nuisance doctrine.2 8 In
King the Court openly acknowledged that it approves a departure from the old rule
that a water hazard, natural or unnatural, if common in nature, would not subject
a landowner to liability to trespassing children, regardless of the age of the child.
It expressly overruled a long line of decisions so holding,29 and adopts the Restate-
ment, section (c), in its literal sense - leaving the question of knowledge as one for
the trier of fact.
While King will stand for trial on its merits, it appears certain that more
defendant because plaintiff failed to show that defendant knew or should have known that
young children were likely to trespass upon his property. See also Garcia v. Soogian, 52 A.C.
107, 338 P.2d 433 (1959); Woods v. San Francisco, 148 Cal. App. 2d 958, 307 P.2d 698
(1957).
22 51 Cal. 2d 94, 331 P.2d 48(1958).
23 See note 15 supra.
24 Malendez v. City of Los Angeles, 8 Cal. 2d 741, 68 P.2d 971 (1937); Wilford v.
Little, 144 Cal. App. 2d 477, 301 P.2d 282 (1956); Lake v. Ferrer, 139 Cal. App. 2d 114,
293 P.2d 104 (1956); Ward v. Oakely, 125 Cal. App. 2d 840, 271 P.2d 536 (1954); Demmer
v. Eureka, 78 Cal. App. 2d 708, 178 P.2d 472 (1947); King v. Simons Brick Co., 52 Cal.
App. 2d 586, 126 P.2d 627 (1942).
25 (1946) p. 748, et seq.
26 The conclusion of the court in Reynolds is hard to reconcile with Ward v. Oakely,
125 Cal. App. 2d 840, 271 P.2d 536 (1954), where two youths were drowned while wading
in a slough. An industrial firm had been extracting a slimy colloidal substance from the
floor of the slough and had abandoned operations. The youths became mired in the slimy
material and were unable to save themselves. The court sustained a demurrer to the com-
plaint on the ground that the colloidal substance was a natural condition. Malendez v. City
of Los Angeles, 8 Cal. 2d 741, 68 P.2d 971 (1937) ; King v. Simons Brick Co., 52 Cal. App.
2d 586, 126 P.2d 627 (1942). See also Betts v. San Francisco, 108 Cal. App. 2d 701, 239
P.2d 456 (1952) (the court denied recovery, as a matter of law, holding that it was common
knowledge among everyone that wet concrete is slippery.)
27 51 Cal. 2d 448, 334 P.2d 870 (1959).
28 See generally comment, 46 CALIF. L. REV. 610 (1958); 31 Miss. L.J. 109 (1959);
Note, 32 So. CAL. L. REV. 421 (1959); 6 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 487 (1959).
29 Knight v. Kaiser Co., 48 Cal.2d 778, 782, 312 P.2d 1089 (1957); Melendez v. City
of Los Angeles, 8 Cal.2d 741, 745, 68 P.2d 971 (1937); Doyle v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 6
Cal.2d 550, 552, 59 P.2d 93 (1936); Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345, 350-51, 355-56, 47
Pac. 113 (1896); Van Winkle v. City of King, 149 Cal. App. 2d 500, 506, 308 P.2d 512
(1957); Wilford v. Little, 144 Cal. App. 2d 477, 480-82, 301 P.2d 282 (1956); Lopez v. Capi-
tol Co., 141 Cal. App. 2d 60, 65-67, 296 P.2d 63 (1956); Lake v. Ferrer, 139 Cal. App. 2d
114, 117-18, 293 P.2d 104 (1956); Ward v. Oakely Co., 125 Cal. App. 2d 840, 845, 271
P.2d 536 (1954) ; King v. Simons Brick Co., 52 Cal. App. 2d 586, 590, 126 P.2d 627 (1942) ;
Beeson v. City of Los Angeles, 115 Cal. App. 122, 126-28, 300 Pac. 993 (1931); Reardon
v. Spring Valley Water Co., 68 Cal. App. 13, 15-17, 228 Pac. 406 (1924).
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stringent safeguards by the owners of private swimming pools will result from the
California Supreme Court's action. The increasing number of private swimming
pools coupled with the consequent danger to wandering infants seems to make
obsolete much of the dicta of the older cases.30 Today the problem consists, as in
King, of having swimming pools, attractive to children of all ages, situated in densely
populated residential districts where only an inattentive minute on the part of a
mother or baby sitter can result in death to children that obviously do not appreci-
ate the danger. Public concern over the problem in Florida and Virginia, states
with judicial rulings similar to California,31 has resulted in legislation designed to
prevent further infant deaths from unfenced swimming pools.
32
Future swimming pool cases promise to focus attention on section 339 (d)
of the Restatement which balances the utility to the possessor of maintaining the
condition against the risk to young children involved therein. Requiring adequate
fences would not impose an undue burden on the landowner compared to the
danger to wandering children where none exists. This could be the next develop-
ment of the attractive nuisance doctrine in California as applied to private swim-
muing pools.
George P. MeAndrews
TORTS - PARENT AND INFANT - FATHER CAN MAINTAIN DERIVATIVE ACTION
AGAINST MINOR UNEMANCIPATED SON. - Plaintiff sought to maintain a derivative
action for damages against his minor unemancipated son. The damages sought were
for loss of services and medical expenses incurred as a result of personal injuries
sustained by another of plaintiff's unemancipated sons in a collision between auto-
mobiles driven by his brother, the defendant, and by the co-defendant. Contending
that an action by a father against his unemancipated son is contrary to public policy,
the defendant son moved to dismiss the complaint as to him. Held: motion denied.
A father can maintain a derivative action for negligence against an unemancipated
minor son. Becker v. Reick, 188 N.Y.S.2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
Traditionally, the Anglo-American courts have been reticent to entertain intra-
family suits. In England, while actions between child and parent affecting real
property and contract rights were allowed in equity,' there is no record of such
30 E.g., Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 355, 47 Pac. 598 (1896). Mr. Justice Beatty, speak-
ing for the court, said: "A pond cannot be rendered inaccessible to boys by any ordinary
means. Certainly no ordinary fence around the lot upon which a pond is situated would
answer the purpose; and, therefore, to make it safe, it must either be filled or drained, or
in other words, destroyed." In 1896, when this case was decided, the principal problem con-
cerning water hazards involved venturesome youths quite capable of realizing the dangerous
potentialities of water, and it was true that fences would have been practically useless in
preventing them from subjecting themselves to danger.
31 Adler v. Copeland, 105 So. 2d 594 (Fla. App. 1958); Washabaugh v. Northern Vir-
ginia Constr. Co., 187 Va. 767, 48 S.E.2d 276 (1948), quoting Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal.
345, 47 Pac. 113 (1896).
32 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 125.01, 167.101 (Supp. 1959).
§ 125.01: County Commissioners - Powers and Duties
(1) To require fences around public or residential swimming pools in said
county, outside municipalities, so as to relieve attractive nuisances and may
prescribe reasonable regulations which such fences must meet in order to
protect the public health, welfare, and safety. (Emphasis added.)
§ 167.101: General Powers of Municipalities:
Fencing of private swimming pools.
"Any municipality may by ordinance require and regulate the fencing of
private swimming pools."
See also: VA. CODE ANpt. § 15-18.1 (Supp. 1958) (Ordinances requiring the fencing of
swimming pools. Penalties for violation include fine and/or jail sentence.)
1 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H 352, 150 Ad. 905 (1930); See generally McCurdy, Torts
Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 H~Av. L. REv. 1030 (1930).
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action in tort.2 Some interpreted this as indicating that clearly the tort action would
not lie,3 while others concluded that the right of action was so clear that it was
not questioned.4 Early text writers, commenting on child v. parent tort actions,
voiced concern for parental discipline should such actions be allowed."
In America, the landmark case involving a child v. parent action is Hewlette
v. George,' an 1891 Mississippi decision, which refused to allow a minor unemanci-
pated child to maintain a false imprisonment action against her parent. Citing
no authority, the court based immunity on protection of parental authority and
family and social peace. This decision was quickly adopted by the majority of
American courts.7 However, as in England, intrafamily suits concerning property
rights were unaffected by the Hewlette decision.
8
In the great majority of tort actions involving parent and child as adverse
parties, the child is plaintiff. Immunity has also been granted in the reverse situa-
tion, the child's immunity often stated as the reciprocal of the parental immunity.9
But all of the reasons asserted in support of parental immunity do not bear out
this reciprocity. 10
Particularly inapplicable to actions in which the parent is plaintiff is the fear
that allowing children to sue parents would undermine parental authority." In-
deed, this might even be ascribed as a ground for the abolition of immunity. A
similar argument which would deem the immunity of the parent as analogous to
the immunity of the sovereign 2 likewise falls when the "sovereign" brings the suit.
The rationale that to allow a judgment would deplete the family exchequer and
sacrifice the family income for the benefit of a member of the family' s would not
apply with force where the child is the defendant, since the unemancipated child's
income rarely supports the family.
On the other hand, some of the bases underlying the intrafamily immunity
doctrine are equally apt if either parent or child brings the action. That an un-
compensated tort in the family would disturb family harmony less than a legal
action,' 4 if true at all, becomes no less true when the parent is the tort-feasor. The
suggestion that recovery should be barred since the defendant possibly could succeed
2 See, e.g., Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927); see McCurdy, supra
note 1.
3 Durham v. Durham, 272 Miss. 76, 85 So.2d 807 (1956); CooLEY, TORTS 171 (1879).
4 Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930).
5 1 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES *452; REEvE, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 420 (1874).
6 Hewlette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
7 See, e.g., McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller,
37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905); PROSSER, TORTS 676 (2d ed. 1955). Negligent torts were
logically included. See, e.g., Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938); Small v.
Morrison, 185 N.C. 557, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Matarese v. Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 Ad.
198 (1925).
8 See, e.g., McKern v. Beck, 73 Ind. App. 92, 126 N.E. 641 (1920); Bobb v. Bobb, 89
Mo. 411, 4 S.W. 511, (1887).
9 See, e.g., Boem v. C. M. Gridley & Sons, 187 Misc. 113, 63 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Sup. Ct.
1946); Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1285.
10 See LoGalbo v. LoGalbo, 138 Misc. 485, 246 N.Y.S. 565 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
11 See, e.g., Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938); Matarese v.
Matarese, 47 R.I. 131, 131 Ad. 198 (1925); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wisc. 260, 212 N.W. 787
(1927).
12 See Martarese v. Martarese, supra note 11. This argument would not seem valid, as it
would preclude any child v. parent action, and clearly such is not the case, property and con-
tract actions never having been challenged. See notes 2 and 11 supra.
13 See Bulloch v. Bulloch, 45 Ga. App. 1, 163 S.E. 708 (1932); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash.
242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905). This argument would apply as well in property and contract actions,
but does not prevent them. Further, it is completely inapplicable if the defendant is indem-
nified by insurance.
14 See Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260,
212 N.W. 787 (1927). That this proposition is generally true would seem doubtful, and it is
clearly false when the defendant is insured. Further, it is not recognized in property and con-
tract actions.
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to the judgment' 5 would apply with equal or greater weight in a case in which the
child is the defendant. Likewise, where there is indemnification by insurance, an
intrafamily action is equally susceptible to fraud or collusion"6 regardless of which
family member sues.
The wisdom of the immunity doctrine, at least in its broad application, has
been questioned 17 and a growing minority recognize exceptions to it. Courts-are
abandoning immunity in cases of intentional or wilful and wanton torts, asserting
that domestic tranquility has already been breached,'8 and that parental authority
does not extend to such behavior. 9 Persons standing in loco parentis, particularly
when representing a deceased parent, enjoy a much more limited immunity. It is
asserted that there no longer exists a family relation to be affected.2 0 Another ex-
ception has appeared where the injury can be characterized as arising from a busi-
ness rather than parental relation.2 1 In these cases, the fact that the defendant is
often insured is thought to overcome the reasons for the immunity doctrine. How-
ever, thus far insurance has not been expressly recognized as an acceptable basis
for removing immunity outside of these cases using the business relation rationale.
22
Missouri, in Wells v. Wells,2s appears to have abolished immunity altogether.24
In the Wells case, the court spoke out against all the policies for immunity that had
been asserted, reasoning that they would be equally applicable in property and
contract actions, yet no immunity is afforded in such cases; thus the tort action
was not distinguished so as to warrant immunity.2 5 Nevertheless, the threat to
parental authority seems more serious in tort actions, and probably should not be
summarily dismissed. The decisions allowing actions for intentional or willful and
wanton torts recognize the desirability of protecting parental authority, but reason
that the parent has put himself outside the scope of immunity by behavior not in
accord with proper performance of the parental duty. The policies other than pro-
tecting parental authority appear to be little more than make-weight, 2 and are
often added when the facts of the case do not actually support this primary policy.27
15 Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905). This argument would appear to
be of little consequence, as it is based on a mere possibility that the defendant could be re-
turned to the same position as the court is leaving him in by denying the action. Further, it
does not prevent property and contract actions.
16 Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N. E.2d 438 (1938).
17 Judge Lord in Davis v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497, 503 (1954):
The Hewlette, McKelvey and Roller cases set the stage and laid a founda-
tion for a large body of decisions in numerous jurisdictions in the United
States flatly denying any right of recovery to a child against a living parent
under any circumstances. But in more recent years it would seem that the
trend of judicial decisions and the thinking of legal writers has been toward
amelioration and limitation of the rule, based upon a recognition that the
Hewlette, McKelvey and Roller cases were wrongly decided.
See also the criticism of broad immunity by Judge Musmano, dissenting in Parks v.
Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957).
18 See, e.g., Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill. App.2d 608, 131 N.E.2d 525 (1956).
19 See, e.g., Buttram v. Buttram, 98 Ga. App. 226, 105 S.E.2d 510 (1958); Henderson
v. Henderson, 169 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 282, 218 P.2d
445 (1950).
20 See, e.g., Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N.E. 961 (1901); Dix v.
Martin, 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S.W. 133 (1913); Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 789,95 N.W. 640
(1903); Steber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 266, 206 N.W. 173 (1925).
21 See, e.g., Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 556, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Worrell v. Worrell,
74 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939).
22 Compare Canadian law allowing action against a negligent parent indemnified by in-
surance. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Marchand, 4 D.L.R. 157 (1924).
23 48 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. App. 1932).
24 PRossER, supra note 8.
25 Wells v. Wells, 48 S.W.2d 109 (Mo. App. 1932).
26 See Borst v. Borst, 42 Wash.2d 642, 251 P.2d 149, 154 (1952).
27 Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905). (Daughter denied action against
her father for rape.)
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The policy of prevention of fraud, 28 and the insurance that gives rise to it,
warrants separate attention, since the bulk of the recent reported child v. parent
actions, and apparently all reported parent v. child actions have involved automobile
accidents, and, presumably, indemnified defendants. 29 When the defendant is idem-
nified by insurance, the force of the immunity arguments fail, except for the fraud
argument. The family funds will not be diminished; in fact, insurance could prevent
ruinous depletion. The authority of the parent would hardly be seriously chal-
lenged since the parent probably institutes the suit himself. In short, naught but
good could come to the family as a result of such an action. Some courts assert
that insurance cannot create liability, only indemnify already existing liability.2 0
But this formal argument has been met by the argument that this would not be a
creation of liability, only a removal of immunity from liability when insurance re-
moves the reason for immunity.3' With the family standing to gain from a judg-
ment in an action covered by insurance, there may be a temptation toward fraud
- but there is danger of fraud in any action. The question then becomes whether
this situation and this class of co-defendants are such as to justify immunity. The
insurance company is a professional defendant, and owes its very existence to the
possibility of liability. If any defendant can rely on the legal safeguards against
fraud, this class of defendants is able to use these safeguards most effectively.
That the decision in the present case was based on the coverage by insurance
was denied by the court, but this fact was possibly an important factor. The court
classified the plaintiff's loss, "although predicated on negligence," as "in the nature
of an infringement on a property right"'2 2 and thus outside the scope of the im-
munity. However the cases decided under the property approach are concerned
exclusively with interests in real property,33 and an inspection of New York pre-
cedent reveals that actions such as that in the present case are now clearly regarded
as personal injury actions.
34
Only one of the traditional bedrocks for immunity - protection of domestic
tranquility - was explicitly recognized by the court. But this they avoided by reason-
ing that to allow the brother recovery against the defendant while at the same time
denying the father recovery would disturb family harmony more than an action
by the father. An equally strong argument would apply in any case in which the
child is insured and the father unable to recover.
It is submitted that the court groped for fictions to reach a desirable conclusion
- the practical abolition of immunity in parent v. child or child v. parent actions.
At the very least, the decision is precedent for a court to determine ad hoc if to
allow the action would actually disrupt domestic tranquility or undermine parental
authority. This indeed would be a long step toward correcting the folly of the
Hewlette decision.
Richard M. Bies
28 Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938).
29 See 60 A.L.R.2d 1285.
30 See, e.g., Duffy v. Duffy, 117 Pa. Super. 500, 178 Atl. 165 (1935); Lasecki v. Kabara,
253 Wis. 645 294 N.E. 33 (1940).
31 See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va.
17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
32 Becker v. Reick, 188 N.Y.S.2d 724, 727 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
33 See, e.g., McKern v. Beck, 73 Ind. App. 92, 126 N.E. 641 (1920); Bobb v. Bobb, 89
Mo. 411, 4 S.W. 511 (1887).
34 Bailey v. Roat, 178 Misc. 870, 36 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1942); Ballentine v. Ahearn, 170
Misc. 651, 10 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1939).
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - MENTAL INJURY - SCiiIZOPHRENIA STEMMING
FROM MENTAL CAUSES IS NONCOMPENSABLE. - Claimant, a taxi driver, hit and
injured a pedestrian who darted out in front of the cab he was driving. When the
police sought to question him and asked for his license he became angry and ap-
peared disturbed although he had suffered no physical injury. A month later he
was admitted to a hospital suffering from a mental disturbance. The Workmen's
Compensation Board awarded compensation for paranoid schizophrenia stemming
from a repressed emotional disorder aggravated by the police questioning after the
accident. On appeal, held: reversed. Under the Workmen's Compensation Law of
New York, there can be no recovery for mental disorder in the absence of other
physical injury. Cherin v. Progress Service Co., 9 App. Div. 2d 170, 192 N.Y.S.2d
758 (1959).
Cherin represents an unfortunate importation from tort law of a long standing
reluctance to recognize the reality of mental suffering. Despite the remedial char-
acter of workmen's compensation the court here has imposed an aspect of the
stringent requirements of tort liability, drawn from the familiar justifications of
public policy and difficulty of proof. The impropriety of tort concepts in the com-
pensation field is apparent in the underlying theories of both.
Workmen's compensation was a revolt from the common law and not merely
an improvement, as it substituted a statutory liability resting upon status rather than
fault.' The problems caused by proximate cause are avoided by the broader re-
quirement of a work-connected injury. Most important, the gravamen of the ac-
tion in compensation cases, with certain exceptions, 2 is disability and not damage.3
This latter fact requires that the compensability of the specific type of injury be de-
termined by criteria peculiar to the field of workmen's compensation and that the
corresponding rules of tort law not be unquestionably adopted as a body of principles.
Under New York tort law it was originally held in Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.
Co.4 that since fright could not be a basis of injury there could be no recovery for
its consequences. Exceptions to this rule subsequently developed, as in Comstock v.
Wilson5 where injuries were sustained from a fall occasioned by fright arising from
a minor automobile accident. In allowing recovery the court said that fright was
only a link in the chain of causation between the collision and the injuries. Recently
there has been a greater relaxation of this rule, and recovery is now allowed for
mental injuries not stemming from a physical injury.6 From the attitude of the
courts in these cases it remains doubtful whether New York would allow recovery
fdr mental injuries without prior physical impact or consequent physical manifes-
tations.
The courts of New York have exhibited a tendency to apply these tort rules in
workmen's compensation cases. Thus, where the mental injury accompanies phy-
sical impact, or physical injuries result from mental shock, compensation has been
awarded.7 But in cases involving hysterical blindness,8 "compensation neurosis," 9
and other similar conditions the courts have notably abandoned these tort concepts
1 HoRoVTz, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 8 (1944).
2 Swartout v. Niagara Falls YMCA, 258 App. Div. 828, 15 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1939) (facial
disfigurement); Farnum v. Gardner Print Works, 229 N.Y. 554, 129 N.E. 912 (1920) (loss
of sexual powers).
3 Charon's Case, 321 Mass. 694, 75 N.E.2d 511, 513 (1947).
4 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
5 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931).
6 Battalla v. State, 17 Misc.2d 548, 184 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (phy-
sical manifestations); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 152 N.E.2d 249
(1958) (X-ray burn causing cancerphobia), noted in 34 NOTRE DAME LAW. 282 (1958).
7 Underwood v. Whitney, 282 App. Div. 783, 122 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1953); Thompson v.
City of Binghamton, 218 App. Div. 451, 218 N.Y.S. 355 (1926).
8 Weber v. George Haiss Mfg. Co., 229 N.Y. 525, 181 N.Y.S. 140, 129 N. E. 900 (1920).
9 Rodriguez v. New York Dock Co., 256 App. Div. 875, 9 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1939), leave
to appeal denied, 280 N.Y. 852, 20 N.E.2d 398.
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and interpreted the workmen's compensation statutes to allow compensation.' 0 If
in the instant case the claimant had suffered a heart attack the next day and died,
he would have received compensation, presumably because the court would have
felt sure that it was real:" It seems an unwarranted distinction to hold that where
an emotional trauma is fatal, compensation will be allowed but not where it merely
disables the worker.
There is a definite trend toward allowing compensation of workmen for men-
tal injuries which arise solely from fright or shock, and are not accompanied by
other physical injuries. 12 One of the most significant cases yet to appear in this area
is Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co."s where a structural steel worker was put in fear
of his life when a scaffold on which he was working gave way on one end and he
witnessed a co-worker plunge to death. Subsequently the claimant suffered a trau-
matic neurosis from the shock and was unable to work. The court granted compen-
sation, reasoning that it was no longer realistic to draw a line between injuries to
the "mind" and those to the "body." An earlier case of similar import was Yates v.
South Kilby Collieries, Ltd.'4 where a miner helped a maimed co-worker and sub-
sequently suffered a nervous collapse. It should be noted that in both Texas and
England, where these two cases were decided, recovery in tort is generally permitted
for mental injury without physical impact.'5
Generally the workmen's compensation cases which have allowed recovery for
mental disorders produced by mental shock have had to interpret "injury" to include
those which are mental.' 6 Courts have even made this interpretation in the face of
a legislative definition requiring "damage or harm to the physical structure of the
body." '" The New York law does not define "injury," but merely states that it
must be accidental.' Other states with identical statutes have interpreted "injury"
to include those purely mental:' 9 It is interesting to note that the New York work-
men's compensation act was originally modeled after the English law, 20 which was
interpreted in Yates v. South Kirby Collieries, Ltd.2" to include mental injuries
caused by a mental shock. In some states where the courts failed to compensate
purely mental injuries special legislative provisions have been added to specifically
include such injuries.
22
It is also necessary in most states to show that the condition claimed was the
result of an accident. 2' In the present case it might be held that routine question-
ing by police does not constitute an accident and was traumatic only in light of the
pre-existing paranoia. And the Board found the cause in the questioning, not in
the collision. However, the psychic trauma which was the basis of the accident
claimed would not have occurred but for the collision and the resulting questioning,
10 Thompson v. City of Binghamton, 218 App. Div. 451, 218 N.Y.S. 355 (1926).
11 Pickerell v. Schumacher, 215 App. Div. 745, 212 N.Y.S. 899, aff'd, 242 N.Y. 577, 152
N.E. 434 (1926).
12 Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955); Charon's
Case, 321 Mass. 694, 75 N.E.2d 511, 513 (1947); Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177
Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941); Yates v. South Kirby Collieries, Ltd., (1910) 2 K.B. 538.
See Annot., 109 A.L.R. 892 (1937); 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 42.23
(1952).
13 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955).
14 [1910] 2 K.B. 538.
15 Houston Elec. Co. v. Dorsett, 145 Tex. 95, 194 S.W.2d 546 (1946); Wilkinson v.
Downton, (1897) 2 Q.B. 57.
16 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 42.20 (1952).
17 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3b (Vernon, 1941), interpreted in Bailey to
include mental injuries caused by fright.
18 N.Y. WORKMEN'S COMP. LAW § 2 (McKinney, 1946).
19 Burlington Mills Corp. v. Hagood, 177 Va. 204, 13 S.E.2d 291 (1941); Klein v. H.
Darling Co., 217 Mich. 485, 187 N.W. 400 (1922).
20 Workmen's Comp. Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 58.
21 [1910] 2 K.B. 538.
22 Wis. STAT. § 102.01 (1957).
23 See RIESENFIELD & MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION 196-97 (1950).
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which was certainly an untoward occurrence. The New York courts in heart cases
have been very liberal in interpreting what was an accidental occurrence, and in
Thompson v. City of Binghamton24 it was held that a false fire alarm was an acci-
dent within the meaning of the statute.
The arguments usually advanced for denying recovery for mental suffering are
the difficulty of proof and the "wide door" of claims that would be opened if re-
covery were allowed. 25 In answer, it has been pointed out that mental disorders are
real diseases which can be caused by psychic trauma and therefore are real injuries
completely analogous to physical injuries. That it may be difficult to establish the
existence or extent of such injury or the causal relationship between the accident
and the disorder is not sufficient ground for the court to quit the field. Medical ex-
perts are increasingly available to help the courts in these matters and both symp-
toms and proof of mental suffering can now be discerned with reasonable certainty.
26
Failure to recognize purely mental injuries defeats the remedial purpose of
workmen's compensation legislation and extends an inequity of tort law. Where
there is doubt as to the right of the injured employee to compensation, it should be
solved in favor of such right as workmen's compensation legislation is remedial, not
fault-finding. 27 The important fact in the instant case remains that the claimant was
incapacitated due to a work-connected injury. Merely because the injury was mental
and could not be attributed to any physical impact he was not compensated. Such
injuries can be as real as physical injuries in terms of disability, and they ought not
be distinguished in workmen's compensation law.
George A. Pelletier, Jr.
WRONGFUL DEATH - INSANITY-SuIcIDE - SUICIDE RESULTING FROM INSAN-
rrY INDUCED BY DEFENDANT'S TORT Is ACTIONABLE. - Plaintiff brought a wrongful
death action to recover for her husband's suicide.' The complaint alleged that de-
cedent, a diamond broker, delivered a diamond to the defendants with the under-
standing that the diamond or its stated value was to be returned upon demand.
Defendants refused to return the diamond to the deceased or to pay for it, and in-
formed decedent that they would deny having received possession thereof. This in-
duced in deceased an irresistible impulse to take his own life. Upon motion to dis-
miss, held: motion denied. The allegation of irresistible impulse is sufficient to con-
stitute an allegation of insanity. Insanity caused by defendants' conversion and re-
sulting in decedent's suicide is adequate to make defendants' intentional tort a proxi-
mate cause of decedent's suicide. Cauverein v. DeMetz, 188 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct.
1959).
Whether an action for wrongful death would lie, where as a result of an in-
tentional wrong a person becomes insane and commits suicide, was a proximate cause
issue that had not been decided in New York before this decision.2 Notwithstanding
24 218 App. Div. 451, 218 N.Y.S. 355 (1926).
25 See PROSSER, TORTS § 37 (1955) where these arguments are discussed and the
author comments that they are losing their force in workmen's compensation.
26 Satterfield, Forensic Psychiatry, GRADWOHL, LEGAL MEDICINE 867 (1954); Goodrich,
Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. Rv. 497 (1922).
27 Jones v. Texas Indem. Ins. Co. 223 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
1 The complaint contained two other causes of action: that the suicide was brought
about by extreme apprehension and severe emotional distress intentionally caused by the wrong-
ful and malicious conduct of defendants, and for the conversion of the deceased's property.
The trial court dismissed the first of these causes for insufficiency and sustained the second.
The scope of this article does not include a discussion of these -rulings.
2 Koch v. Fox, 71 App. Div. 288, 75 N.Y.S. 913, 920-1 (1902) (The court did not de-
cide this issue of proximate cause); Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 Fed. 92 (2d Cir. 1921) (The
Second Circuit, sitting in a case from the federal district court of New York, affirmed a demur-
rer to a wrongful death action for suicide).
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the diverse tests which have been formulated by the courts to determine proximate
cause,3 in suits for suicide under wrongful death and workmen's compensation acts
only two tests are generally used.
The foreseeability test, first applied under a wrongful death act in Scheffer v.
Railroad Co.,4 requires that proximate cause can be found only when the deceased's
insanity and/or suicide could be reasonably expected and foreseen. 5 Recovery has
been denied in one negligence and three intentional tort cases7 where this test has
been used in actions brought under wrongful death acts. No case has been found
using the foreseeability test where the action has been brought under the workmen's
compensation acts.
The almost universally used "uncontrollable impulse" test was first laid down
in Daniels v. New York, N.A., & H.R.R. where the court held that
... the liability of a defendant for a death by suicide exists only when the
death is the result of an uncontrollable impulse, or is accomplished in deli-
rium or frenzy [caused by the wrongful act] ... and without conscious vo-
lition to produce death.8
As in all the other cases involving wrongful death acts,9 all of which were based
on defendant's negligence toward the deceased, application of the uncontrollable
impulse test resulted in no recovery.10 However, under the workmen's compensation
acts, where the deceased employee is physically injured at work and as a result sub-
sequently becomes insane or emotionally upset and commits suicide, recovery has
been granted. The cases granting recovery usually involve an eccentric, violent or
weird form of self-destruction close in time to the physical injury,"- while those
denying recovery often involve a melancholy form of derangement which results in
a quiet, solitary and planned suicide,12 although there are exceptions.' 3 In work-
3 PROSSER, TORTS 252-8 (2d ed. 1955); 27 FoRDHAm L. R.v. 457 (1958).
4 105 U.S. 249 (1881).
5 Id., at 252.
6 Ibid.
7 E.g., Stevens v. Steadman, 140 Ga. 680, 79 S.E. 564,566 (1913). (Decedent took an
overdose of narcotics); Salsedo v. Palmer, 278 Fed. 92, 96 (2d Cir. 1921) (While confined
and tortured, decedent jumped from hotel window); Jones v. Stewart, 183 Tenn. 176, 191
S.W.2d 439 (1946) (Decedent hanged himself).
8 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424, 426 (1903) The court continued:
An act of suicide resulting from a moderately intelligent power of choice,
even though the choice is determined by a disordered mind, should be
deemed a new and independent, efficient cause of the death that immedi-
ately ensues.
9 E.g., Brown v. American Steel & Wire Co., 43 Ind. App. 560, 88 N.E. 80 (1909)
(Deceased ran away from home and slit his neck in a cornfield) ; Long v. Omaha & C. B. Ry.,
108 Neb. 342, 187 N. W. 930 (1922) (Seven days after accident decedent blew the top of
his head off; he had been of low mentality and nervous before the accident) ; Arsnow v. Red
Top Cab Co., 159 Wash. 137, 292 Pac. 436 (1930) (Deceased threatened to shoot himself;
a few days later he did). See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 455 (1934).
10 By recovery or no recovery is meant that the complaint was sustained with a subsequent
trial or dismissed without a trial, or that the verdict should have been for the plaintiff or for
the defendant.
11 In re Sponatski, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N. E. 466, 468 (1915) (Deceased, while in a hos-
pital for treatment of his injury, jumped from a window during an hallucination); Lupfer v.
Baldwin Locomotive Works, 269 Pa. 275, 112 Atl. 458 (1921) (Five days after the accident
deceased shot himself while delirious with pain); Sinclair's Case, 248 Mass. 414, 143 N. E. 330
(1924) (Gradual starvation); Wilder v. Russell Library Co., 107 Conn. 56, 139 Atl. 644
(1927) (Physical, then mental breakdown followed by suicide); Gasperin v. Consolidated Coal
Co., 293 Pa. 589, 143 Atl. 187 (1928) (While in hospital, decedent jumped from a window);
Baber v. Knapp & Sons, 164 Md. 55, 163 Ad. 862 (1933) (Decedent wounded two neighbors
while in a rage and then shot himself); Jackson Hill Coal & Coke Co. v. Slover, 102 Ind. App.
145, 199 N. E. 417 (1936) (Decedent had periods of complete despondency and rage after the
accident; during one of these periods, three years later, he shot himself); McFarland v. Dept.
of Labor and Industries, 188 Wash. 357, 62 P.2d 714 (1936) (During a fit of violence de-
cedent hanged himself). See Voris v. Texas Employers Insurance Ass'n, 190 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.
1951) (Decedent shot himself).
12 E.g., Tetrault's Case, 278 Mass. 447, 180 N.E. 231 (1932) (Decedent jumped
from a bridge); Kazazian v. Segan, 14 N. J. Misc. 78, 182 Ad. 351 (1936) (Care-
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men's compensation actions the uncontrollable impulse test has been used exclusively
except in New York.14 There, suicide resulting simply from discouragement or
melancholy is insufficient to meet the proximate cause requirements. The suicide
must derive from a "brain derangement" or disease caused by the physical injury.'5
The instant court recognized that the New York courts had used the "brain
derangement" test to determine proximate cause in the workmen's compensation
cases, but it rejected this test as not up-to-date.16 It then noted that the wrong was
intentional, which makes the wrongdoer responsible for direct injuries even though
they may have been unforeseeable. Rejecting the foreseeability test, the court con-
strued the allegation of irresistible impulse as sufficient to constitute an allegation of
insanity - the proximate cause of the decedent's death.' 7 In effect, it used the un-
controllable impulse test.
The court's rejection of the foreseeability test because the wrong was intentional
may be legally sound. But whether the uncontrollable impulse test is always more
appropriate in insanity-suicide cases under a wrongful death act is questionable.
The court's choice of tests is guided by the interplay of problems of policy and
the mixed considerations of logic, common sense, justice, and philosophical com-
mitments.' This can readily be seen in the workmen's compensation cases where
the aim of the acts - to redress the economic loss of the laboring class in industrial
accidents' - overrides other considerations which may influence the choice of
proximate cause tests. Recovery is generally allowed regardless of the test applied.
2 0
However, the wrongful death acts, although originally enacted to alleviate the harsh
common law rule of no recovery for the representatives of a wrongfully killed de-
ceased,2' do not result in such strict liability. All the legal requirements for a negli-
gent or intentional tort action must be met.2 2 It would seem, therefore, that the
general social policy of the acts does not outweigh the mixed considerations under-
lying whatever proximate cause test the court may choose.
The court in the Daniels case had recognized the philosophical consideration
fully executed hanging); Konazewska v. Erie R. R., 132 N.J.L. 424, 41 A.2d 130 (1945)
(Decedent hanged himself in a basement); Barber v. Industrial Commission, 241 Wis. 462, 6
N.W.2d 199 (1942) (Decedent went to Canada by himself and committed suicide in a hotel
room; Workmer's Compensation Act excludes compensation for an intentionally self-inflicted
injury).
13 E.g., Industrial Comm. of Ohio v. Brubaker, 129 Ohio St. 617, 196 N.E. 409 (1935)
(Decedent shot himself); Kasman v. Hillman Coal & Coke Co., 149 Pa. Super. 263, 27 A.2d
762 (1942) (Decedent shot himself; Workmen's Compensation Act excludes compensation for
intentionally self-inflicted death or injury).
14 Delinousha v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 248 N.Y. 93, 161 N.E. 431, 432 (1928) (Recovery);
Pushkarowitz v. Kramer, 300 N.Y. 637, 90 N. E.2d 484 (1950) (Recovery); Aponte v. Gar-
cia, 279 App. Div. 269, 109 N.Y.S.2d 761, 766 (1952) (No recovery) (Dissent: Doctrine in
Delinousha case must be applied cautiously because mental derangement exists independently
of actual physical degeneration of the brain); Sulfaro v. Pellegrino, 2 A.D.2d 426, 156
N.Y.S.2d 411 (1956) (Recovery).
15 Delinousha v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 248 N.Y. 93, 161 N.E. 431, 432 (1928). In 1957, a
memorandum decision from a lower New York appellate court held that recovery could be
had because there was a causal relation between the injury, insanity and the suicide. The de-
cision intimated that the facts could satisfy even the stricter test enunciated in Delinousha, if
that test was still the law. Nohe v. Sheffield Farms Co., 4 A. D.2d 711, 163 N.Y.S.2d 455,
457 (1957).
16 Cauverein v. DeMetz, 188 N.Y.S.2d 627, 632 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
17 Id., at 632-3.
18 See PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 257; Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 690, 693 (1953).
19 Delinousha v. Nat'l Biscuit Co., 248 N.Y. 93, 161 N. E. 431, 432 (1928); In re Sponat-
ski, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E. 466, 468 (1915).
20 See cases cited, notes 11, 12, 13 and 14 supra.
21 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 710.
22 2 HARPER & JAMES, LAw OF TORTS 1285, 1289 (1956). Courts narrowly interpret the
wrongful death acts so as not to impose strict liability upon defendant. Likewise affirmative
defenses which would be good against the deceased, if living, are good against the deceased's
representatives suing under the wrongful death acts.
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which might underly its decision. It stated: "Some contend that we are all slaves
of destiny. Our subject brings us near to the vexed theological problem as to free
will and predestination." 23 The final decision, resulting in the choice of the irresis-
tible impulse doctrine, seems to have been motivated by an extreme freewill view.
Such a perspective sees every deliberate act of man as the result of his freedom to
choose. 24 This view pursued to its logical conclusion holds man responsible for all
his deliberate acts, no matter what the circumstances. 25 It seems to be committed
to an extreme view which holds the suicidal victim, not the tort feasor, responsible
for his suicide if he had more than one choice. No other person can be the cause
of the deceased's action unless the deceased was entirely without choice as a result
of the defendant's wrong.
26
From this extreme, the courts espousing the foreseeability test seem to move to
a contrary extreme and adopt the mechanistic view which sees man as a part of a
mechanistic universe wherein he reacts in any given situation as he must because
he is completely controlled by external cause; man has no choice. 7 Under the fore-
seeability test, the responsibility of the actor to the suicide's estate is nothing more
than a deterrent to such unsocial reactions.
28
It is submitted that neither the uncontrollable impulse test nor the foreseeability
test is supported by a proper philosophical commitment. Each view is an extreme
which excludes entirely any of the basic propositions of the other.29 In addition,
each test poses problems for the fact finder. The uncontrollable impulse test is too
specific; fact finders will seldom be able to determine that the deceased was com-
pletely devoid of the power to choose. The foreseeability test is too vague; the fact
finders are unable to say that the resulting insanity of the deceased was foreseeable
or within the reasonably expectable risk of the defendant's action. A proximate cause
test which affords the fact finder some guide more specific than foreseeability and
less rigid than irresistible impulse would be preferable. It should recognize man as
one of the prime causes of his deliberate acts because of his freedom of choice, but
also appreciate that man in his choice may be primarily motivated by many ex-
ternal factors. This view - in medio stat virtus - is more readily supported by
modern science.
It is suggested that a more appropriate proximate cause test for these tort-
insanity-suicide cases would be one similar to the substantial factor test.30 It should
ask: Were the defendant's wrongful acts a substantial factor in motivating the de-
ceased to commit suicide? The fact finder should scrutinize the facts of each case,
and if the actor's wrong has substantially influenced the decedent's particular con-
duct even though the decedent may not have been completely devoid of conscious
23 Daniels v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 183 Mass. 393, 67 N.E. 424, 426 (1903).
24 See KOESTLER, REFLECTIONS ON HANGING 90-91 (1957).
25 See KOESTLER, id. at 97-104 (Koestler maintains that criminal law with its basic idea
of criminal responsibility is a judicial philosophy of man's freedom to react in more ways than
one to a situation). E.g. People v. Lewis, 124 Cal. 551, 57 Pac. 470 (1899); Whiteside v.
State, 29 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Crim. 1930) ; Stephenson v. State, 205 Ind. 141, 179 N. E. 633
(1932).
26 Contra, KOESTLER, op. cit. supra note 24, at 102.
27 See id., at 86-92.
28 In a reasonably expected situation the civil liability will be a factor automatically caus-
ing a socially useful solution, but the situation must be foreseeable so that the civil liability can
be a mechanical, automatic cause in determining useful conduct.
29 Man's deliberate acts are either perfectly or imperfectly voluntary according to cir-
cumstances and the influence of outside forces. Many forces external to a particular man may,
in a particular situation, lessen his voluntariness or freedom; for example, fear, passion, and
coercion from another. 1 J. McHuGH & C. CALLAN, MORAL THEOLOGY 16-22 (1958).
30 Jeremiah Smith originally suggested the "substantial factor" test, but it received little
acceptance until the Restatement of Torts in 1934 adopted it in sections 431-2. In some juris-
dictions this test has become and still is predominantly used. See 2 HARPER & JAmEs, LAW OF
TORTS 1158-60, 1161 n. 54 (1956).
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volition, recovery should be allowed. 31 With no binding precedent in New York, the
instant court would have done well to re-evaluate the two tests used in sister states
and to formulate a more appropriate one to determine whether an action for wrong-
ful death will lie, where as a result of an intentional wrong a person becomes insane
and commits suicide.
Thomas M. Clusserath
ZONING - LIMITATIONS - CITY COUNCIL LIMrrED By MUNICIPAL CHARTER AND
FEDERAL AND STATE CoNsTITuTIoNs.- The Colorado State Constitution grants to
the people of Denver the right of full self-government in local and municipal mat-
ters." Denver amended its city charter in 1923 to authorize the city council to pass
zoning laws. Relying upon this grant Denver passed an ordinance2 on November
7, 1956, which divided the commercial area of the city into two districts, B-6 and
B-5. The ordinance required that arrangements be made for off-street parking
facilities, varying according to eight specified trade categories,3 before a building
permit would be issued for a business use otherwise lawful in district B-6. Building
of apartment houses was forbidden and existing apartment houses were declared
to be nonconforming uses,4 subject to a number of conditions and regulations. These
provisions, which purported to be effective as of February 11, 1955, did not apply
to district B-5. Plaintiffs, property owners in district B-6,5 attacked the validity of
the ordinance, praying for a declaration of their rights and for an injunction re-
straining its enforcement. Held: the ordinance constituted retrospective legislation,"
was in part beyond the authority conferred upon the city by the charter amendment
and was so unreasonable and arbitrary as to be without due process of law and to
be a taking of private property for public use without just compensation. City and
County of Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 347 P.2d 919 (Colo. 1959).
Zoning is the classification of land into districts with different regulations apply-
ing to the property in each district.7 The division is made according to the character
of lands and structures and their peculiar suitability for particular uses, with regard
31 Elliott v. Stone Baking Co., 49 Ga. App. 515, 176 S. E. 112 (1934). In sustaining a
complaint against defendant under the wrongful death act, the. court used a substantial factor-
proximate cause test rather than the foreseeability test applied in an earlier Georgia Supreme
Court decision, Stevens v. Steadman. 140 Ga. 680, 79 S.E. 564 (1930).
1 CoLo. CONST. art. xx § 1. See Heron v. City of Denver, 131 Colo. 501, 283 P.2d 647
(1955). Such cities are commonly called "home rule cities." Fishel v. Denver, 106 Colo. 576,
108 P.2d 236 (1940).
2 Ordinance No. 392, series of 1956.
3 The ordinance is not fully set out in the case. However, it appears that the area re-
quired for parking varies in relation to the square feet of proposed use of different trade
classes. Thus more parking space must be set aside for 1000 square feet of proposed restaurant
use than for 1000 square feet of proposed office use.
4 A pre-existing use of property valid before the enactment of any zoning regulation
or valid under a previous zoning law and allowed to exist under a subsequent zoning law
in technical violation of it is a nonconforming use. City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App.
2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).
5 There were a number of plaintiffs. Their specific positions were not made clear but
it appears that one was denied a permit because his plan did not meet the requirements
of the proposed but not yet enacted ordinance. After passage of the ordinance, another had
his permit denied because his plans provided for insufficient off-street parking. A third owned
an apartment house which constituted a nonconforming use.
6 Because of the recent, comprehensive coverage of retroactive zoning ordinances in 34
NOTRE DAME LAW. 109 (1958), this point will not be discussed in this comment.
7 Toulouse v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 147 Me. 387, 87 A.2d 670 (1952); Mans-
field & Swett v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 198 Atl. 225 (1938).
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to the uniformity of use within each district8 Zoning laws and regulations find their
justification in some aspect of the police power exercised for the public welfare or
in the public interest.9 The states possess this authority inherently, since it is a
derivative of the power of the state to create the municipality itself.' 0
In the public interest the state can and does specifically delegate this authority
to municipal corporations." The municipal corporation, however; must not act
beyond the authority so delegated to it by the enabling legislation. 2. For although
ordinances passed under enabling legislation specifically authorizing the passage of
zoning ordinances may restrict the use of property, 3 such restrictions under general
police power grants to a municipality are viewed with hostility by the courts.'4
Zoning ordinances are by their nature susceptible to a three-pronged attack.
The contentions, traditionally urged, are that the ordinance exceeds the power
conferred by the enabling legislation, 5 that the classification into districts does not
distinguish upon a reasonable basis,'- and that as to a particular district the regula-
tions have no substantial relation to ends proper to the police power but constitute
a taking of private property without due process of law."
On the first ground of attack the courts are divided upon the proper approach
to the problem. On occasion the judges cannot agree among themselves. The
scope of the power conferred by the zoning enabling act may be enlarged by a
liberal construction in recognition of the needs of a changing world,"8 or narrowly
confined by strictly construing all zoning legislation as being in derogation of the
common law. 9 In the instant case the contention was made that the enabling
amendment conferred no power upon the city to enact legislation concerning non-
conforming uses. The majority, in accordance with the settled practice in the
Colorado courts in such cases,"0 construed the enabling legislation narrowly. It
found no specific authorization concerning nonconforming uses and concluded that
the city council had none of the powers which it purported to exercise concerning
them. The dissenters concluded that such powers did not have to be specifically
stated since they were implicit in any enabling legislation. It is submitted that the
dissenters were in error. The enabling amendment was passed in 1923. At that
time the authority to eliminate or restrict nonconforming uses was usually not dele-
gated because it was then thought that such regulations would be unconstitutional,
2'
and that they were unnecessary in any event since nonconforming uses would soon
disappear without regulation.
22
The approach of the courts to the second and third lines of attack is uniform.
It is recognized that in the first instance it is a legislative function to determine
8 Northwest Merchants Terminal v. O'Rourke, 191 Md. 171, 60 A.2d 743 (1948);
Bogert v. Washington Tp., 21 N.J. 180, 135 A.2d 1 (1957).
9 Hedgcock v. People ex rel. Reed, 91 Colo. 155, 13 P.2d 264 (1932).
10 Mansfield & Swett v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 198 Adt. 225 (1938).
11 General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Goodman, 128 Colo. 344, 262 P.2d 261 (1953);
City of Colorado Springs v. Miller, 95 Colo. 337, 36 P.2d 161 (1934).
12 Bishop v. Board of Zoning Appeals of New Haven, 133 Conn. 614, 53 A.2d 659
(1947).
13 Colby v. Board of Adjustment, 81 Colo. 344, 255 Pac. 443 (1927).
14 Cross v. Bilett, 122 Colo. 278, 221 P.2d 923 (1950).
15 Bishop v. Board of Zoning Appeals of New Haven, 133 Conn. 614, 53 A.2d 659
(1947).
16 Hedgeock v. People ex rel. Arden Realty and Investment Co., 98 Colo. 522, 57 P.2d
891 (1936).
17 Bahn v. Board of Adjustment of 'City and County of Denver, 129 Colo. 539, 271 P.2d
1051 (1954); American University v. Prentiss, 113 F. Supp. 389 (D.D.C. 1953).
18 In re Gilfillan's Permit, 291 Pa. 358, 140 At!. 136 (1927).
19 Toulouse v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 147 Me. 387, 87 A.2d 670 (1952).
20 E.g., City and County of Denver v. Thrailkill, 125 Colo, 488, 244 P.2d 1074 (1952).
21 44 CORNELL L.Q. 450 (1959). In 1953 the authority to legislate concerning non-
conforming uses was specifically delegated to the counties of Colorado for the development
of unincorporated territories. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 106-2-19 (1953).
22 City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954).
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what zoning rules and regulations are legitimate expressions of the police power2"
and that a large area of discretion is necessarily vested in the local legislative body
to determine what the public interest requires and what measures are necessary for
the protection of that interest.24 It is said that there are so few scientifically certain
criteria of legislation, that it is often difficult to mark the line where the police
power is limited by constitutional provision, and that the courts should therefore
be slow to find enactments of the law-making power unconstitutional.
25
Thus, in determining whether a legislative classification is upon a reasonable
basis26 or whether a regulation in any particular district bears a substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morals, comfort or welfare, 27 every presumption in
favor of the validity of the ordinance obtains in the courts. 28 Moreover, the burden
of proof is upon the party attacking the zoning ordinance to prove its unreason-
ableness. 29 If the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance is questionable, the ordi-
nance must stand.30
The determination as to validity must be made upon an examination of the
particular facts and circumstances in each case, 1 since a zoning ordinance valid
as a proper exercise of the police power in one set of circumstances may be invalid
in another.3
2
This mode of approach appeared to be that followed by the Colorado courts,
2 2
but in the present case the court ignored it and, as it had done on two other oc-
casions, also in the name of judicial review,3 substituted its judgment for a proper
discretionary judgment of another body.
The court did not permit Denver to introduce evidence to prove the reason-
able basis of its classification or regulations. The trial court was permitted to make
its findings instead upon "knowledge common to any citizen."
One of the dissenters"5 objected to the court's upholding of the determination
of the trial court that the off-street parking requirements were a deprivation of
property without due process of law and a taking of private property without just
compensation. He reasoned that this close question of degree 0 could not be de-
cided upon general propositions without looking at the particular facts. In addition
he stated that neither could the reasonableness of the classification be determined
from the record, and that he would have remanded this phase of the proceeding
to the trial court to take and hear evidence.
23 Greenberg v. City of New Rochelle, 206 Misc. 28, 129 N.Y.S.2d 691 (1954); Mans-
field & Swett v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 198 AtI. 225 (1938).
24 Mansfield & Swett v. Town of West Orange, supra note 23.
25 Ibid.
26 Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 497, 234 Pac. 388 (1925).
27 Bahn v. Board of Adjustment of City and County of Denver, 129 Colo. 539, 271
P.2d 1051 (1954).
28 Standard Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (Fla. App. 1950); 101 C.J.S.
Zoning § 362 (1958).
29 Sinclair Refining Co. v. City of Chicago, 178 F.2d 214 (Ill. App. 1949); 101 C.J.S.
Zoning § 363 (1958).
30 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); American University
v. Prentiss, 113 F. Supp. 389 (D.D.C. 1953).
31 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Anchor Steel and
Conveyor Co. v. City of Dearborn, 342 Mich. 361, 70 N.W.2d 753 (1955); Gordon v. City
of Wheaton, 12 Ill. 2d 284, 146 N.E.2d 37 (1957).
32 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); City of New York v.
Jack Parker Associates, Inc., 5 Misc. 2d 633, 161 N.Y.S.2d 731 (1957).
33 DiSalle v. Giggal, 128 Colo. 208, 261 P.2d 499 (1953); Hedgcock v. People ex rel.
Arden Realty and Investment Co., 98 Colo. 522, 57 P.2d 891 (1936).
34 Jones v. Board of Adjustment, 119 Colo. 420, 204 P.2d 560 (1949); Board of Adjust-
ment of the City and County of Denver v. Perlmutter Construction Co., 131 Colo. 230, 280
P.2d 1107 (1955).
35 Judge Sutton concurred in part and dissented in part.
36 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
That this view and the law upon which it rests is most reasonable 7 is made
poignantly clear by what happened in this case. The majority of the court found
the classification unreasonable and arbitrary "upon knowledge common to any
citizen."3 It is submitted that the determinations made by the trial court and
upheld by the Supreme Court of Colorado were founded upon insufficient facts
and that the opinion, with its sweeping prohibitions and flagrant disregard for legis-
lative determinations in this area, exhibits a philosophical aversion to all zoning.-
9
Rocco L. Puntureri
37 See footnotes 31, 32, 33 and accompanying text.
38 Yet one of the dissenting judges stated that by looking out his office window one could
see the very marked differences in the districts accounting for their different treatment.
39 City and County of Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 347 P.2d 919,943 (1959).
